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Abstract 
 
 
Inequitable land ownership has been, and continues to be, an enormous problem 
confronting Guatemala.  Since it was first perceived to impede ideals and conceptions of 
progress, the ways in which land concentration has been problematized have evolved and 
expanded to include a variety of concerns.  Consequentially, a variety of attempts have been 
made throughout Guatemala’s history to distribute land more equitably.  One of the most recent 
attempts has been through the implementation of a Market-Led Agrarian Reform (MLAR).  This 
model of agrarian reform emerged in the 1980s out of criticisms of previous, state-led reforms 
and the growing neo-liberal rationale that resources are most efficiently and peacefully, 
distributed through market forces.   Since the 1990s, the MLAR has gained prominence and has 
been widely implemented with the support of the World Bank (WB) in countries such as Brazil, 
Philippines, Colombia, and Guatemala.  Although the inadequacy of the MLAR model and its 
objectives is well-documented, it is less clear to what extent the model has been able to achieve 
its own goals, however limited they may be.  The following examines the outcomes of 
Guatemala’s MLAR in light of its justification and objectives and argues that the MLAR has 
largely failed in its own terms.  Instead of improving access to land and alleviating poverty, the 
reform has resulted in massive beneficiary indebtedness, increased poverty, and the re-
concentration of land.  
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CHAPTER 1 Introduction 
 
 
Inequitable land ownership has been, and continues to be, an enormous problem 
confronting Guatemala.  Since it was first perceived to impede ideals and conceptions of 
progress, the ways in which land concentration has been problematized have evolved and 
expanded to include a variety of concerns.  Consequentially, a variety of attempts have been 
made throughout Guatemala’s history to distribute land more equitably.  One of the most recent 
attempts has been through the implementation of a Market-Led Agrarian Reform (MLAR). This 
model of agrarian reform emerged in the 1980s out of criticisms of previous, state-led reforms 
and the growing neo-liberal rationale that resources are most efficiently and peacefully 
distributed through market forces.1  Since the 1990s, the MLAR has gained prominence and has 
been widely implemented with the support of the World Bank (WB) in countries such as Brazil, 
Philippines, Colombia, and Guatemala.   
Guatemala’s MLAR received its mandate from the 1996 Peace Accords which, in 
addition to formally ending Guatemala’s 36-year civil-war, recognized land concentration as a 
fundamental obstacle to the realization of peace and development.2  Moreover, these accords 
placed responsibility on the government to address land concentration by implementing several 
market-led policies, which ultimately constituted an MLAR.3  
                                                             
1 Shalmali Guttal, “Forward” in Promised Lands: Competing Visions on Agrarian Reform (Oakland: Food 
First Books, 2006), ix. 
2 Jennifer Schirmer, The Guatemalan Military Project: A Violence Called Democracy (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1998), 15, 16. 
3 “The Socio-economic Accord: Agreement on Social and Economic Aspects of the Agrarian Situation” 
in Negotiating Rights: The Guatemalan Peace Process (London: Conciliation Resources, 1997). 
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As the name suggests, the Market-Led Agrarian Reform, also referred to as the Market-
Assisted Land Reform (MALR) is an approach to agrarian reform which distributes land via the 
market. The model is based on the assumption that the market, when functioning properly, is the 
best arbiter of supply and demand.4  An MLAR therefore attempts to improve the functioning of 
land markets by improving access to the market and by securing private property rights.  The 
organization which has been responsible for overseeing these components of the MLAR in 
Guatemala is called FONTIERRAS or the Land Fund (Fondo de Tierras).  FONTIERRAS 
administers three programs: The Access to Land Program, the Land Leasing Program, and the 
Land Regularization Program.  This thesis focuses on the outcomes of the Access to Land 
Program (which facilitates the purchasing of land) and the Land Regularization Program (which 
assists in formalizing land title).5  
Between the years of 1997 and 2011, FONTIERRAS assisted 20,010 families in 
purchasing land and issued 19,254 titles to land.6  There has been significant criticism of both the 
inadequacy and slow pace of land redistribution under this reform.  Some scholars have argued 
that the reform has failed to meet the demands of the rural poor while others have suggested that 
the rural poor have been more successful when they circumvent the MLAR completely and 
                                                             
4 Hannah Wittman and Laura Saldivar-Tanaka, “The Agrarian Question in Guatemala,” in Promised 
Lands: Competing Visions on Agrarian Reform. Edited by Peter Rosset, Raj  
Patel and Michael Courville (Oakland: Food First Books, 2006), 37. 
5 FONTIERRAS, “Mecanismos y Avances Institucionales en la Observancia y Aplicabilidad de los 
Derechos Humanos de Comunidades Indígenas,” 2011, 2.  
6 FONTIERRAS, “Fondo de Tierras Programa de Acceso a la Tierra No. de Fincas Aprobadas y 
Entregadas,” 2.  http://www.fontierras.gob.gt/index.php/resultados-institucionales/2011-11-02-15-56-
54/listado-de-fincas-entregadas-1998-a-septiembre-2011; FONTIERRAS, “Resultados Institucionales,” 
http://www.fontierras.gob.gt/index.php/resultados-institucionales; FONTIERRAS, “Mecanismos y 
Avances institucionales en la observancia y aplicabilidad de los Derechos Humanos de Comunidades 
Indígenas,” 2012, 8. 
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engage in direct occupation of land.7  Nonetheless, it is appropriate to assess the MLAR in terms 
of what its own literature argues it aimed to achieve—that being, improved access to land and 
the alleviation of poverty.  The following examines the outcomes of the MLAR in light of its 
justification and objectives and argues that the MLAR has largely failed in its own terms.  
Instead of increasing access to land and alleviating poverty, the reform has resulted in massive 
beneficiary indebtedness, increased poverty, and the re-concentration of land.   
But first, how did Guatemala come to have one of the most inequitable patterns of land 
distribution in the world?  The following provides a brief history of how land became 
concentrated in Guatemala and how an MLAR came to be the most recent attempt at rectifying 
the situation.   
 
A History of Concentration: Conquest, Force, and Coercion 
 
 
Although the MLAR has been extensively implemented in response to demands for land 
throughout the world, the history which explains Guatemala’s land concentration is unique. 
When the Spanish first arrived in, what is now, Guatemala, they forced much of the indigenous 
population from their lands and resettled them into centralized villages.  This land was then 
granted to Creoles and the Spanish in order to produce cacao, indigo, and cochineal for 
exportation. 8  After independence from Spain in 1821 and later from Central America in 1840, 
the displacement of indigenous communities continued.  Governments worked quickly to pass 
                                                             
7 Simon Granovsky-Larsen, “Between the Bullet and the Bank: Agrarian Conflict and Access to Land in 
Neoliberal Guatemala,” The Journal of Peasant Studies 40 no. 2 (2013). 
8 Wittman and Laura Saldivar-Tanaka, “The Agrarian Question in Guatemala,” 26; Susan A. Berger, 
Political and Agrarian Development in Guatemala (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), 5.  
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resolutions to transfer large extensions of community-held land, to private ownership to secure 
land and labor for the expansion of large-scale export agriculture, namely coffee and banana 
production.9  Between 1896 and 1921,  it is reported that 1.6 million hectares of land were 
transferred to private hands.10 Through the continued state promotion of investment and 
settlement, and the further granting of state and indigenous lands to plantation owners, land 
quickly became concentrated in the hands of few individuals.    
The first major attempt to redistribute land to the rural poor came shortly following the 
first, free elections in Guatemalan history.  In 1952, Jacobo Árbenz Guzmán began to implement 
his newly passed Agrarian Reform Law titled, “The Most Precious Fruit of the Revolution.”  
This law allowed peasants and peasant groups to claim uncultivated land greater than 224 acres 
(0.902 km²) for which the government would compensate based on self-declared land valuations 
in the fiscal registry of rural property.11  Under the Agrarian Reform Law (Decree 900) over 
100,000 families benefitted from the redistribution of 765,233 manzanas, totaling 526,465 
hectares, between the years of 1952 and 1954.12   
One company severely affected by the agrarian reform was the United Fruit Company 
(UFCO), an American corporation that had become the largest landowner in Guatemala.  
Because 85% of their land was uncultivated at the time (said to be held in reserve in case of 
                                                             
9 David McCreery, “Land, Labour, And Community,” in The Guatemala Reader: History, Culture, 
Politics Edited by Greg Grandin, Deborah T. Levenson, Elizabeth Oglesby (Durham: Duke University 
Press, 2011), 121.  
10 Rupert W. Scofield, “Land Reform in Central America,” in Agrarian Reform and Grassroots 
Development: Ten Case Studies Edited by Roy L. Posterman, Mary N. Temple, and Timothy M. Hanstad 
(Boulder: L. Rienner, 1990), 163.  
11 Government of Guatemala, “The Most Precious Fruit of the Revolution,” in The Guatemala Reader: 
History, Culture, Politics Edited by Greg Grandin, Deborah T. Levenson, Elizabeth Oglesby (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 2011), 217-218. 
12 One manzana is equal to 1.7 acres. Hectares calculated by author using figures found in Handy, 
Revolution in the Countryside, 90-92, 94, 197.  
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natural disasters), the UFCO lost roughly 150,000 hectares in the reform.13  They were offered 
$600,000 in bonds by the Government of Guatemala (GoG) based on the UFCO’s self-declared 
tax valuation, but the UFCO and the United States State Department felt the amount was 
insufficient.14  Although the agrarian reform faced local opposition (from the Catholic Church, 
the middle-class business sector, and plantation owners), opposition to the reform by the UFCO 
and the US government, along with cold war sentiments, were what ultimately led to the CIA-
assisted overthrow of Árbenz in 1954 and the instillation of a new authoritarian regime under the 
presidency of Carlos Castillo Armas.15  Shortly thereafter, the land reform which redistributed 
nearly 20% of the total arable land in Guatemala at the time, to nearly 100,000 families, was 
almost entirely reversed.16 
With the return to dictatorship came increased militarization, repression, corruption, and 
organized opposition.17  This opposition towards the government eventually became the focus of 
the military’s counter-insurgency, initiating Guatemala’s civil-war which continued for the next 
36 years.  During the civil-war, over 200,000 Guatemalans were killed or disappeared, and over 
1 million were displaced due to violence. 18   
Throughout the civil-war, demands for land continued.  Instead of attempting to 
expropriate and redistribute land, as the previous state-led agrarian reform had, the government 
                                                             
13 Thomas E. Skidmore, Peter H. Smith, Modern Latin America (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 
390; Berger, Political and Agrarian Development in Guatemala, 70; Handy, Revolution in the 
Countryside, 197. 
14 Berger, Political and Agrarian Development, 80. 
15 Ibid., 73.  
16 Handy, Revolution in the Countryside, 94; Berger, Political and Agrarian Development, 77.  
17 Jennifer Schirmer, The Guatemalan Military Project: A Violence Called Democracy, 15, 16. 
18 “Conclusions II. Human Rights Violations, Acts of Violence and Assignment of Responsibility,” in 
Guatemala Memory of Silence: Report of the Commission for the Historical Clarification Conclusions 
and Recommendations.  https://www.aaas.org/sites/default/files/migrate/uploads/mos_en.pdf (Accessed 
September 2016). 
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placated demands from the rural poor by facilitating the colonization of frontier areas of the 
country and by subdividing large state farms.  According to USAID, more than two-thirds of 
land distributed between 1955 and 1982 was in frontier areas.19  In addition, over 600,000 
hectares of state-owned land was distributed by the Institute for Agrarian Transformation 
(Instituto de Transformación Agraria, INTA) between 1962 and 1999 (although many recipients 
did not end up having title to this land until FONTIERRAS took over).20  Meanwhile, violence 
from the ongoing civil-war and desires for progress continued to displace many Guatemalans.  
By 1982, 375,000 families were reported to be landless.21 
One of the most violent dispossessions for the purpose of progress occurred during the 
1970s and 1980s when the Chixoy Dam, funded by the WB and Inter-American Development 
Bank was built on the Chixoy River.  Before loans were meant to be dispersed by these banks for 
the construction of the dam, a resettlement plan for the nearly 3,400 indigenous residents of the 
river-valley was required.  These resettlement plans were never completed and without 
consulting or even notifying the affected communities, funding was dispersed and the dam was 
built.  Although some residents did resettle, many, most notably the residents of Río Negro, did 
not.  Tensions escalated in this heavily-militarized region and a series of massacres were 
conducted by the military and civil patrols under military control.  In one village alone, 487 
                                                             
19 Susana Lastarria-Cornhiel, “Guatemala Country Brief: Property Rights and Land Market,” Land Tenure 
Center, University of Wisconsin (2003): 12. 
20 Simon Granovsky-Larsen, “Within and Against the Market: The Guatemalan Campesino Movement 
Under Neoliberal Peace,” PhD Dissertation, York University, Toronto, 2014, 58.  
21 Roy L. Posterman, Mary N. Temple, and Timothy M. Hanstad Ed., Agrarian Reform and Grassroots 
Development: Ten Case Studies, (Boulder: L. Rienner, 1990), 20. 
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people were murdered.  This development project not only led to thousands of murders, but it 
displaced over 3,500 people and negatively affected the livelihoods of thousands more.22   
As the war continued and violence escalated, much of which was directly related to 
disputes over land, and the number of displaced persons grew, demands for real, structural 
change intensified.23  Peasant organizations occupied lands and increased their political activity 
to force agrarian reform to be part of the negotiations for peace.24  As previously mentioned, the 
MLAR was what was negotiated and then mandated in the Peace Accords.  According to Susan 
Gauster and S. Ryan Isakson, the agreement to implement a MLAR stemmed from opposition 
towards more redistributive methods of reform from the business and land-owning elite, 
encouragement from United Nations (UN) facilitators to adopt resolutions consistent with WB 
and International Monetary Fund (IMF) policies, and pressure from a group of countries 
providing international support for the peace process.25   
 
Historiography, Methods, Sources, and Limitations 
 
I chose to investigate the extent to which the Guatemala’s MLAR has been able to 
achieve its own stated goals of reducing poverty through improved access to land because, 
according Saturnino Borras Jr., the success of a reform, despite a literature of crude assessments, 
                                                             
22 Barbara Rose Johnston, “Development Disaster, Reparations, and the Right to Remedy: The Case of 
the Chixoy Dam, Guatemala,” in Development & Dispossession: The Crisis of Forced Displacement and 
Resettlement, edited by Anthony Oliver-Smith (Santa Fe: School of Advanced Research, 2009), 208-215.  
23 Mathijs Van Leeuwen, “To Conform or to Confront? CSOs and Agrarian 
Conflict in Post Conflict Guatemala,” Journal of Latin American Studies 42, no. 1 (2010): 98. 
24 Wittman and Laura Saldivar-Tanaka, “The Agrarian Question in Guatemala,” 34. 
25 Susan Gauster and S Ryan Isakson, “Eliminating Market Distortions, Perpetuating Rural Inequality: an 
evaluation of market-assisted land reform in Guatemala,” Third World Quarterly 28, 8 (2007). 
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is always a matter of degree.26  The formulation of this question has also been informed by the 
historiography or agrarian reform and the questions which remain.  
The main debates within the study of agrarian reform have centered around the potential 
for agrarian reform to promote various economic, social, and political outcomes.27  These desired 
outcomes have shifted over time and have included: the redistribution of wealth and power, 
increased land productivity, industrialization and modernization, equity, growth, employment, 
improved well-being, environmental protection, political stability, political inclusion and 
democratization, and more recently, poverty alleviation.  Driving the changing motives for 
agrarian reform have been paradigm shifts, changing values, the evolution of knowledge, and 
new actors involved in land policy and the demand for change.  Similarly, these influences have 
led to changes in methods and approaches to agrarian reform.  This has prompted discussions as 
to which methods and approaches are best suited to achieve particular goals and which models 
have the potential to fulfill added criteria such as gender equity or administrative efficiency, for 
example.   
Over the years, it has become apparent that many agrarian reforms, despite bold policies 
and good intentions, have proven to be ineffectual.28  In response to this realization, assessments 
of agrarian reforms have expanded to discuss the importance of political will, capacity to 
                                                             
26 Saturnino M. Borras Jr., “The Underlying Assumptions, Theory, and Practice of Neoliberal Land 
Policies,” in Promised Lands: Competing Visions on Agrarian Reform. Edited by Peter Rosset, Raj  
Patel and Michael Courville. (Oakland: Food First Books, 2006), 111. 
27 Michael Lipton, “The Theory of the Optimizing Peasant,” The Journal of Development Studies 4 no. 3 
(1968): 327; John H. Powelson and Richard Stock, The Peasant Betrayed: Agriculture and Land Reform 
in the Third World (Washington: Cato Institute, 1990); Marvin Ortega, “The State the Peasant and the 
Sandinista Revolution,” the Journal of Development Studies 26 no. 4(1990):  124.  William C. 
Thiesenhusen, Broken Promises: Agrarian Reform and the Latin American Campesino. (Madison: 
University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1995). 
28 Thiesenhusen, Broken Promises. 
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implement, and suitable conditions.  This thesis builds upon this knowledge and examines not 
only the MLAR model of agrarian reform, but also commitment to the program, implementation, 
and the context in which the reform was applied.  
 Although there have been many evaluations of the MLARs implemented in countries 
such as South Africa, Brazil, Philippines, and Colombia, there have been less systematic 
assessments of the Guatemalan case.  Hannah Wittman and Laura Saldivar-Tanaka briefly 
discuss the recent reform in their chapter in Promised Lands: Competing Visions on Agrarian 
Reform, and assess the potential of the Peace Accords to rectify inequitable ownership.29  
Gauster and Isakson also offer an assessment of the reform and argue that the MLAR in 
Guatemala did not improve access to land because of the inherit limitations of the MLAR model 
itself.30  Both of these works provided extensive background to reform, but provided limited 
detail into how the MLAR specifically functioned and in what context.  These authors also 
focused more on the inadequacy of the MLAR model in regards to the expectations of 
Guatemalans than the reform’s ability to address poverty and limited development.  
Other works have assessed the reform in comparison to other methods of accessing land 
in Guatemala.  Simon Granovsky-Larsen argues that historical land claims, rural labour disputes, 
and land occupations have resulted in greater peasant access to land than what has been achieved 
through the MLAR system.31  Because of works like these, and others, the shortcomings of the 
MLAR model are well-documented—these being that the MLAR is fundamentally non-
                                                             
29 Wittman and Laura Saldivar-Tanaka, “The Agrarian Question in Guatemala,” in Promised Lands: 
Competing Visions on Agrarian Reform. Edited by Peter Rosset, Raj  
Patel and Michael Courville (Oakland: Food First Books, 2006). 
30 Gauster and S Ryan Isakson, “Eliminating Market Distortions,” 1533-1534. 
31 Granovsky-Larsen, “Between the Bullet and the Bank: Agrarian Conflict and Access to Land in 
Neoliberal Guatemala,” 325. 
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redistributive, it fails to address existing power relations that have created the exclusionary 
economy the model attempts to rectify, and it fails to acknowledge the non-commodity nature of 
land.32  By reducing land concentration to a market problem, the MLAR has neglected all other 
grounds for agrarian reform, including equity, justice, the environment, and food sovereignty.  
Predictably, Guatemala’s MLAR has done little to improve these issues. These conclusions, 
although significant, have neither engaged the proponents of the MLAR model nor have they 
affected the ongoing MLAR in Guatemala.  However limited or insufficient the objectives of the 
MLAR may be, the question remains: to what extent has the MLAR been able to achieve its own 
stated goals? 
Guatemala’s experience with the MLAR is the result of many histories intersecting at a 
particular time and place. This context, which is essential for understanding the reform, 
interpreting the outcomes of the reform, and informing any evaluation, has not been addressed in 
previous assessments. My research therefore builds upon previous works, and places a new 
assessment of the reform within a broader and more contextualized narrative.    
           The continued need for better solutions to land concentration has also informed my 
research question.  Guatemala has one of the most skewed patterns of land distribution in the 
world with a Gini coefficient of .84.33   As the Peace Accords established, inequality in land 
                                                             
32 Courville and Raj Patel, “The Resurgence of Agrarian Reform in the Twenty-first Century,” in 
Promised Lands: Competing Visions on Agrarian Reform. Edited by Peter Rosset, Raj  
Patel and Michael Courville (Oakland: Food First Books, 2006), 11, 18-19. 
33 The Gini coefficient is a measurement of inequality, in which 0 represents total equality and 1 
represents maximum inequality. Wittman and Laura Saldivar-Tanaka, “The Agrarian Question in 
Guatemala,” 24; República de Guatemala Instituto Nacional de Estadística, “IV Censo Nacional 
Agropecuario: Características Generales de las Fincas Censales y de Productoras y Productores 
Agropecuarios,” 2004, 19. 
https://www.ine.gob.gt/sistema/uploads/2014/01/16/cv9H2R2CyhS1n0c1XfKqXVf4pLIxONTg.pdf. 
(Accessed November 6, 2016).  
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ownership has prevented the country from achieving its economic potential and has been a 
principal cause of extreme poverty and violence. Overcoming this legacy is, therefore, of critical 
importance. Any knowledge gained from examining the results of this reform can be used to 
inform other students, researchers, activists, and policy-makers.   
In approaching my research question, I created a list of smaller research questions that 
when answered, would provide insight into my larger question.  Because existing literature has 
not explored the implementation of FONTIERRAS’ programs in finer detail, I wanted to know: 
how did FONTIERRAS’ programs function? Who were the beneficiaries?  And how did 
beneficiaries gain access to land or receive land title?  I also wanted to know what quality of land 
was acquired and where it was located. What have been the costs, benefits, and conditions of 
access to land?  And has the newly-acquired tenure been secure? Additional awareness and 
incites into what questions would be revealing came from reviewing assessments of other 
MLARs and the historiography of agrarian reform, in general. 
I sought answers to these questions in FONTIERRAS’ progress reports, WB documents, 
Guatemalan newspaper articles, Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) and Civil Society 
Organization (CSO) evaluations, and government publications. The majority of these sources 
were found on the internet, on the webpages of organizations or through online archives and 
databases. These sources provided both qualitative and quantitative information on the reform 
and included some beneficiary perspectives through interviews conducted by other researchers. 
These answers were then assessed against a framework which was based upon the assumptions 
of the MLAR model and objectives of FONTIERRAS. 
One of the main limitations of this research has been the political nature of existing 
sources.  Land issues in Guatemala are very complicated and contentious, often having their 
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roots in violent events.  This has made it dangerous for those making demands for land and for 
those investigating and reporting on these topics, thereby limiting access and dissemination of 
information.  It is not uncommon for political leaders and activists to be killed and researchers 
threatened.  I did attempt some archival and field work in Guatemala for this project where I 
visited several communities who were seeking the assistance of FONTIERRAS to defend their 
land titles, but made the decision to leave in response to violence.  The material I gathered during 
that trip was not used in this paper.  How I have attempted to overcome this limitation is by 
acknowledging and critically examining all my sources and using sources from varying political 
perspectives.  
The second limitation of this research has been that the detailed outcomes of this reform 
have been insufficiently monitored and documented.  The WB, for one, has done an extremely 
poor job of evaluating their involvement and outcomes of the reform.  Their evaluations are 
crude, rating achievements and the success of entire programs as either “High,” “Substantial,” 
“Modest,” or “Negligible.”  According to The Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) which 
assesses WB projects, neither of the WB’s projects which funded aspects of the MLAR in 
Guatemala made adequate provision for impact evaluation.34  One of the main “lessons learned” 
by the WB was to take baseline data prior to program implementation, because they had not done 
so for their MLAR projects in Guatemala.35  Because of this, I used a variety of sources to 
establish baseline data including records from the GoG, Food and Agriculture Organization 
                                                             
34 The World Bank, “World Bank Support to Land Administration 
and Land Redistribution in Central America Report No.: 55341 An IEG Performance Assessment of 
Three Projects: El Salvador, Land Administration Project (Loan No. 3982) Guatemala, Land 
Administration Project (Loan No. 4415) Guatemala, Land Fund Project (Loan No. 4432)” June 30, 2010: 
22. 
35 The World Bank, “Implementation Completion and Results Report (IBRD-44150) on a Loan in the 
Amount of US$31.0 Million to the Republic of Guatemala for a Land Administration Project,” 2007: 24. 
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(FAO), United States Agency for International Development (USAID), United Nations 
Development Program (UNDP), Oxfam, Amnesty International and other sources.   
The subsequent section outlines how my assessment will proceed.   
 
What will Follow 
 
 
The body of this thesis contains two chapters, each of which examines a separate 
program administered by FONTIERRAS.  Chapter 2, titled “Debt-Ridden Reform: 
FONTIERRAS’ Access to Land Program,” begins by situating the WB’s MLAR model within a 
broader history of agrarian reform, demonstrating the variety of methods, means, and ends of 
agrarian reforms.  This history counters the WB’s current understanding of the history of 
agrarian reform and is used to inform my analysis of Guatemala’s MLAR later in the chapter.  
The chapter then explains the emergence of the MLAR, its promotion by the WB, and how it 
came to be included in Guatemala’s Peace Accords.  I then take a closer look at the Access to 
Land Program, what its goals were and how it functioned.  I provide some results from this 
program, explain these results, and then analyze them against the assumptions the MLAR was 
built on, arguing that instead of improving access to land, FONTIERRAS’ Access to Land 
Program has led to beneficiary indebtedness and increased poverty.   
Chapter 3, titled, “Legal Displacement and the Solidification of Historical Inequalities:  
FONTIERRAS’ Land Regularization Program,” begins by discussing the various motives, 
assumptions, and justifications for promoting land regularization, one of the key approaches the 
MLAR employs to improve the functioning of the land market.  The chapter then examines the 
outcomes of the Land Regularization Program (specifically regarding land surveying and titling) 
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and measures these outcomes against the presumed benefits of the program. This chapter 
demonstrates how land regularization has not led to improved access to credit, increased tenure 
security, and a reduction in violence and poverty, but has facilitated the expansion of export 
agriculture at the expense of further displacement and the re-concentration of land.   
 Finally, in Chapter 4, I synthesize my analysis of FONTIERRAS’ Access to Land and 
Land Regularization Program and make the case that Guatemala’s MLAR has largely been a 
failure in its own terms—a failure for Guatemala’s rural poor, but not for the elite who 
benefitted, first by avoiding expropriative agrarian reform in the peace negotiations and then 
again from the MLAR itself.  I close by discussing the implications of these conclusions, how 
these conclusions fit within the existing literature, and what comes next.    
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CHAPTER 2 Debt-Ridden Reform: FONTIERRAS’ Access to Land Program 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
The MLAR model of agrarian reform is one of the latest, in a long series of policy 
initiatives aimed towards affecting land distribution.  Following a brief period in the 1980s, when 
discussing redistributive agrarian reform was too politically sensitive, the WB successfully 
reframed inequitable land ownership as a market problem and put agrarian reform, in the form of 
an MLAR, back on the policy agenda, this time as a strategy for poverty alleviation. To the WB, 
“improving access to land [was] key to the alleviation of poverty, which [in 2000, according to 
the WB, afflicted] about 75% of Guatemalans, especially the rural and indigenous 
populations.”36  After much debate and encouragement from several actors, including the WB, 
several resolutions which together constituted a MLAR (although not explicitly labelled a 
MLAR) were agreed to and mandated in the Guatemalan Peace Accords. Soon after, 
FONTIERRAS was established and Guatemala’s MLAR began.   
There are several components which comprised Guatemala’s MLAR. These components 
included facilitating access to land by providing credit through a Land Fund, regularizing land 
tenure (legal reform, standardizing the process for acquiring land, cadastral surveying, land 
titling, resolving land conflicts), and providing credit and technical assistance.  Not all of these 
efforts fell within the mandate of FONTIERRAS, but many did.  
                                                             
36  The World Bank, “World Bank Approves Land Fund Project for Guatemala: Press Release,” 2000. 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/PROJECTS/0,,contentMDK:20012841~menuPK:64282
137~pagePK:41367~piPK:279616~theSitePK:40941,00.html. 
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 This chapter examines the successes of FONTIERRAS’ primary objective—facilitating 
access to land through the “Access to Land Program” and asks: to what extent has this program 
achieved its goals?  The following argues that even though FONTIERRAS’ Access to Land 
Program assisted thousands of families in purchasing land between the years of 1997-2011, the 
model’s inherent preferences, deficient implementation, and unfavorable conditions have meant 
that FONTIERRAS was unable to improve secure access to land in Guatemala, let alone improve 
the distribution of land.  Instead, the program has indebted and further impoverished the majority 
its beneficiaries.  
 
A History of Agrarian Reform: Diverging Approaches to Evolving Problems 
 
 
Before examining the impact of Guatemala’s MLAR, it is essential to situate the model 
within a broader history of agrarian reform.  Doing so will create a fuller understanding of how 
and why agrarian reforms appeared, evolved, disappeared and reappeared in development policy 
agendas and how the MLAR emerged and was justified specifically.  This history is not meant to 
be an exhaustive history of agrarian reform, but it serves to highlight some important and varying 
examples which together counter the WB’s narrative that has been used to both justify and 
falsely inform evaluations of the MLAR.  
Although the MLAR model is relatively new approach to agrarian reform, variations of 
agrarian reform have been carried out since ancient times.  This past century, however, has 
witnessed the most agrarian reforms in human history.37   In justifying the MLAR, the WB has 
                                                             
37 Saturnino M. Borras Jr., Cristóbal Kay and A. Haroon Akram Lodhi, “ISS/UNDP Land, Poverty and 
Public Action Policy Paper No. 1 Agrarian Reform and Rural Development: Historical Overview and 
Current Issues,” The Institute of Social Studies. 
17 
 
asserted that previous methods of agrarian reforms have been inefficient, contentious, and 
ultimately unsuccessful.38  But this position does not accurately reflect the history of agrarian 
reform.   Agrarian reforms have taken a variety of approaches, responding to an array of 
concerns, and have had varying levels of success and failure.  
Redistributive agrarian reforms have been a popular development strategy over the past 
century.39  Although not labelled “development” until after WWII, similar aspirations for 
progress through agrarian change began in the late 19th century.  Influenced by liberal and 
socialist economic thought and the evolution of knowledge regarding the relationship between 
productivity and land ownership, leaders in countries such as China, Guatemala, Mexico, and the 
former Soviet Union undertook varying styles of agrarian reforms as a strategy to towards their 
national development.40  Following WWII, highly redistributive agrarian reforms were also 
implemented in China, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan.  These reforms have been attributed to 
helping reduce rural poverty and contributing to the rapid industrialization and modernization 
which has made the economies of these countries some of the world’s fastest-growing in the 
second half of the 20th century.41 
Agrarian reforms have also been utilized for political reasons across all ideologies.  
During the Cold War, reforms became part of broader strategies to quell leftist revolutions by 
                                                             
http://www.iss.nl/content/download/3831/37212/file/ISS%20UNDP%20Overview%20paper.pdf 
(Accessed October 12, 2011), 2. 
38 The World Bank, “Market-Assisted Land Reform: A New Solution to Old Problems,” Agriculture & 
Natural Resource Department Dissemination Notes No. 4 (August 1995). 
39 Borras Jr., “The Underlying Assumptions, Theory, and Practice of Neoliberal Policies,” 100. 
40 Courville and Raj Patel, “The Resurgence of Agrarian Reform in the Twenty-first Century,” 16. 
41 John P. Powelson and Richard Stock, The Peasant Betrayed: Agriculture and Land Reform in the Third 
World (Washington: Cato Institute, 1990), 188; James K. Boyce, Peter Rosset, and Elizabeth A. Stanton, 
“Land Reform and Sustainable Development,” Political Economy Research Institute (2005): 4.  
http://scholarworks.umass.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1079&context=peri_workingpapers. 
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pacifying the landless.  During the 1960s, through the Alliance for Progress, the United States 
supported many capitalist-oriented agrarian reforms across Latin America in an effort to secure 
capitalism and promote democracy.42  Although this application of agrarian reform was only 
used for a short period, other political motivations have led to agrarian reforms, including 
legitimizing the rule of elected parties following their election in such places as Kerala and Chile 
and simply general political compromise.43 
When governments have failed to redistribute land, peasants have worked for change 
from below in what is called a “society-driven agrarian reform.” These have been attempted in 
various ways.  Peasant-based revolutions have brought about agrarian change in Bolivia and 
Mexico, while more recently land occupations have had significant success in countries 
including Brazil and Zimbabwe.  In recent years, over tens of millions of hectares have been 
redistributed through land occupations in Brazil and Zimbabwe.44  
While some agrarian reforms sought to redistribute already concentrated land, as in the 
case of Guatemala’s agrarian reform in the 1950s, others have been non-redistributive and have 
affected land concentration by making new land available.  In the second half of the twentieth 
century, the WB financed many of these resettlement schemes.  In Latin America specifically, 
colonizing the frontier increased overall arable land by 109% between the years of 1950 and 
1980.45   
                                                             
42 Philip McMichael, Development and Social Change: A Global Perspective Fourth Edition (Los 
Angeles: Pine Forge Press, 2008), 82. 
43 Courville and Raj Patel, “The Resurgence of Agrarian Reform in the Twenty-first Century,” 16. 
44 Peter Rosset, “Introduction.  Alternatives: Between the State Above and the Movement Below,” in 
Promised Lands: Competing Visions of Agrarian Reform (Oakland: Food First Books, 2006), 222. 
45 McMichael, Development and Social Change: A Global Perspective Fourth Edition, 82.  
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Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, agrarian reforms continued.  Yet as a development 
strategy, agrarian reform was practically eliminated from the policy agendas of international 
development institutions. This was because the need for pre-emptive agrarian reforms had 
largely diminished, governments in the developing world were financially crippled from the debt 
crisis, and agrarian reform, in general, was increasingly being viewed by these institutions as 
overly bureaucratic, politically-sensitive, and unsuccessful.46  
 By the 1990s however, agrarian reform was back on many policy agendas, including the 
policy agenda of the WB.  A confluence of several events and processes explains this.  First, the 
failure of the WB/IMF-inspired structural adjustment programmes in the 1980s and 1990s to 
deliver economic growth further fueled rural unrest and mobilized social organizations to 
intensify their demands for land.47  Additionally, land-related conflicts such as the Chiapas 
uprising in Mexico and state-instigated land invasions in Zimbabwe reminded the world that 
although agrarian reforms had briefly left the agendas of development institutions, it had never 
left the political agenda of peasants and their organizations.48  The Cold War and recent civil-
wars in Guatemala, Nicaragua, and El Salvador had also just ended at this time.  To policy 
makers, peasants in these post-war countries were political actors that needed to be “courted, 
neutralized, or blocked.”49  In light of these violent conflicts and failed attempts to promote 
                                                             
46 Borras, Cristóbal Kay and A. Haroon Akram Lodhi, “ISS/UNDP Land, Poverty and Public Action 
Policy Paper No.1,” 9, 10. 
47 Edward Lahiff, Saturnino M. Borras, Jr., Cristobal Kay, “Market-Led Agrarian Reform: Policies, 
Performance and Prospects,” Third World Quarterly 28, no. 8 (2007): 1420. 
48 Borras, Cristóbal Kay and A. Haroon Akram Lodhi, “ISS/UNDP Land, Poverty and Public Action 
Policy Paper No.1,” 12. 
49 Marc Edelman, “Transnational Organizing in Agrarian Central America: Histories, Challenges, 
Prospects,” in Transnational Agrarian Movements Confronting Globalization, edited by in Saturnino M. 
Borras Jr., Marc Edelman, and Cristobal Kay, (Sussex: Blackwell Publishing, 2008), 62.  
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growth, the role of agrarian reform was again being recognized as a tool for promoting peace and 
growth and the transition to democracy.50   
Arguably, most significant process which helped resurrect and re-legitimize agrarian 
reform was the shift back to liberalism.51  Neo-liberalism and its prescription for progress 
through privatization, liberalization, and deregulation, allowed for all aspects of society to be 
explained in economic terms.  By framing inequitable land ownership as solely a market 
problem, agrarian reform (specifically the MLAR) was no longer considered to be too political, 
radical, or taboo.52  Moreover, this new conceptualization allowed for new actors to take the 
leading role in agrarian change.  
 
The World Bank and the Rise of the MLAR  
 
 
The rise of the MLAR can largely be attributed to its extensive promotion by the WB.  
The WB, originally named the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), 
was created in 1944 at the Bretton Woods Conference to help facilitate European reconstruction 
following WWII.53  After the need for reconstruction in Europe diminished, the WB shifted its 
focus to providing for “basic needs” in the Global South.  In relation to land, this meant 
supporting resettlement schemes, land titling programs, and funding infrastructure projects which 
                                                             
50 Richard Jolly, Louis Emmerij, Dharam Ghai, and Frederic Lapeyre, UN Contributions to Development 
Thinking and Practice (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004), 177. 
51 Carmen Diana Deere, “Foreword” in Promised Lands: Competing Visions on Agrarian Reform. 
Oakland: Food First Books, 2006, ix.  
52 Shamali Guttal, Peter Rosset, and Maisa Luisa Mendonca, “Preface: A History and Overview of the 
Land Research Action Network” in Promised Lands: Competing Visions on Agrarian Reform. Oakland: 
Food First Books, 2006, xiii;  
53 McMichael, Development and Social Change, 58. 
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were needed to increase agricultural production.54  Although the Bank did not directly finance 
state-led agrarian reforms, they did, in fact, acknowledge the merits of state-led, redistributive 
land reforms on the grounds of equity and efficiency, citing the successes of Asian land 
redistribution in their “1975 Land Reform Policy Paper”.55  
When the WB resurrected agrarian reform in the early 1990s, they completely reframed 
and rebranded agrarian reform.  First, they reduced the problem of land concentration to a 
distribution problem caused by the market inefficiencies.  According to Jim Scott, state 
simplification is imposed to make an undertaking manageable, reflecting capacity, scope, and a 
small number of objectives.56  To be sure, reducing land concentration to a market problem, 
established inequitable land distribution as a problem which fit within the WB’s capacity, scope 
of influence, and mandate.  The WB also transformed the approach to agrarian reform, where 
instead of addressing concentration with redistribution, the solution to concentration became 
extending access to the land market, thereby affecting distribution. Until this point in time, the 
majority of agrarian reforms were almost entirely of the conventional, state-led (or 
revolutionary) variety.57  According to the WB, the MLAR was going to be the “New Solution to 
Old Problems,” (see Figure 1) overcoming the disputes, delays, and inefficiencies which, 
according to their perspective in the 1990s, undermined previous conventional reforms.58    
                                                             
54 The World Bank, “Land Reform Policy Paper 1975,” 38.   
55 Ibid., 11, 40.  
56 Jim Scott, “State Simplifications: Nature, Space and People,” The Journal of Political Philosophy 3, no 
3 (1995): 195.   
57 Klaus Deininger and Hans Binswanger, “The Evolution of World Bank’s Land Policy,” The World 
Bank Research Observer 14 no. 2 (1999): 255.  
58 The World Bank, “Market-Assisted Land Reform: A New Solution to Old Problems,” Agriculture & 
Natural Resource Department Dissemination Notes No. 4 (August 1995): 1.  
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In fact, the MLAR model was designed in complete opposition to state-led agrarian 
reforms.   Where state-led reforms were purported by the WB to be coercive, supply-driven, 
contentious, and expensive, the market-led approach was touted to be voluntary, demand-driven, 
non-contentious, and cost-effective.59  Although the WB never supported their claims, 
analytically or empirically, WB-funded MLAR projects were welcomed by elites (as a way to 
avoid the expropriation and redistribution associated with other types of agrarian reform) and 
implemented in 48 countries (76 projects) between the years of 1990 and 2014.60 
As previously explained, agrarian reforms have been implemented in hopes of achieving 
a variety of goals; these goals included redistributing wealth and power, modernizing and 
industrialising agricultural production, facilitating development, pacifying the landless and 
discouraging communism, legitimizing rule, promoting democratization and peace, and 
redressing historical inequalities.  When the WB resurrected agrarian reform, poverty alleviation 
became the primary motive, situating the MLAR within the Bank’s most recent mandate to 
reduce poverty through an “inclusive and sustainable globalization.”61  Interestingly, early WB 
policy papers also discussed the MLAR as an approach to addressing the “farm debt crisis” (see 
Figure 1) which many developing countries, including Guatemala, were experiencing due to 
structural adjustment programs imposed on them earlier by the WB and the IMF.62  This 
justification does not seem to survive long in WB documentation nor is it used as a motive for 
                                                             
59 Borras Jr., “The Underlying Assumptions, Theory, and Practice of Neoliberal Land Policies,” 108-109.  
60 Kevin A Gould, “Everyday expertise: land regularization and the conditions for land grabs in Petén, 
Guatemala,” Environment and Planning 46 (2014): 2353. 
61 The World Bank, “History,” http://www.worldbank.org/en/about/history. (Accessed July 2015). 
62 The World Bank, “Market-Assisted Land Reform: Helping Solve a Debt Crisis,” Agriculture & Natural 
Resource Department Dissemination Notes No. 5 (August 1995): 2. 
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agrarian reform in Guatemala.  
 
Figure 1: World Bank Publications Reflecting their Intentions for the MLAR 
 
 
 
Source: The World Bank, “Market-Assisted Land Reform: Helping Solve a Debt Crisis,” and The World 
Bank, “Market-Assisted Land Reform: A New Solution to Old Problems.” 
 
 
The Guatemalan Peace Accords: A Neo-Liberal Peace 
 
 
On December 29, 1996, after 10 years of gradually moving towards peace and several 
years of direct negotiations, the final Peace Accord was signed by the GoG and the Unidad 
Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG), officially ending Guatemala’s 36-year civil-
war.  Besides establishing a formal ceasefire, these 13 accords laid the groundwork for a 
transition to a more democratic and inclusive society.  The organization responsible for drafting 
the blue print for change was the Assembly of Civil Society (ASC).  
 The ASC was established in 1994 following the Framework Accord and was given the 
mandate to bring together diverse sectors of society to provide recommendations to the URNG 
and the GoG.  The organization was made up of political parties, religious groups, trade unions, 
popular organisations, women's organisations, other non-governmental development 
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organisations, research centres, human rights groups, and media organisations.  Together within 
the ASC, these organizations were responsible for formulating consensus positions on six major 
issues: 1) strengthening civil society and the function of the army in a democratic society; 2) the 
identity and rights of indigenous people; 3) constitutional reform and the electoral regime; 4) the 
resettlement of those displaced by the conflict; 5) socio-economic conditions; and 6) the agrarian 
situation.  These recommendations were not binding, but were considered by the negotiators.  In 
turn, the ASC would decide if they would endorse the final agreements (which they did), thereby 
facilitating the implementation of commitments within the accords.63  According to Enrique 
Alvarez, a founding member of the ASC, the “ASC's mandate meant that civil society [had] a 
formal place at the negotiating table; they [had] a voice, but not a decision-making vote.”64 
Despite not having any decision-making power, many of the ASC's recommendations were 
incorporated into the final accords. 65 
Initially, Guatemala’s economic elite condemned and boycotted the negotiations, but as 
discussions began to encompass potential agrarian reform, the private sector began to participate 
through the powerful Coordinating Committee of Agricultural, Industrial and Financial 
Associations (CACIF).66  CACIF was meant to be part of the ASC, but they refused to join and 
instead lobbied directly to negotiators.  According to Enrique Alvarez and Tania Palencia Prado, 
                                                             
63 Enrique Alvarez, “The Civil Society Assembly: Shaping agreement,” Conciliation Resources 2003. 
http://www.c-r.org/accord-article/civil-society-assembly-shaping-agreement. (Accessed November 29, 
2016).  
64 Ibid. 
65 Enrique Alvarez and Tania Palencia Prado, “Owning the process: Public participation in peacemaking,” 
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66 Simon Granovsky-Larsen, “The Peace of the Oligarchs: Land Distribution and the Guatemalan Peace 
Process,” Canadian Journal of Development Studies 24 no. 4 (2003): 621. 
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CACIF had significant influence in the negotiations and successfully substituted many of their 
own recommendations in the final agreements.67   
In the Agreement on Social and Economic Aspects and Agrarian Situation, the authors of 
the accords provide a perspective on the land problem with which few would disagree:  
27. It is essential and unavoidable to solve the problems of agrarian reform and rural 
development in order to address the situation of the majority population, which live 
in rural areas and is most affected by poverty, extreme poverty, injustice and the 
weakness of State institution…68 
28. Land is central to the problems of rural development. From the conquest to the 
present, historic events, often tragic, have left deep traces in ethnic, social and 
economic relations concerning property and land use. These have led to a situation of 
concentration of resources which contrasts with the poverty of the majority and 
hinders the development of Guatemala as a whole. It is essential to redress and 
overcome this legacy and promote more efficient and more equitable farming, 
strengthening the potential of all those involved, not only in terms of productive 
capacity but also in enhancing the cultures and value systems which coexist and 
intermingle in the rural areas of Guatemala.69 
 
Where opinions differed, however, were on the appropriate resolutions to land concentration.  
While indigenous groups such as The Coordination of Organizations of Mayan Peoples 
(COPMAGUA) pushed for an expropriative and redistributive land reform, organizations 
representing large-landowners such as CACIF argued for the further privatization of communal 
and state lands.70  Ultimately, the Peace Accords mandated several approaches to addressing land 
                                                             
67 Alvarez and Tania Palencia Prado, “Owning the process: Public participation in peacemaking.”  
68“Agreement on Social and Economic Aspects and Agrarian Situation concluded on 6 May 1996 
between the Presidential Peace Commission of the Government of Guatemala and the Unidad 
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economic%20and%20agrarian%20situation.pdf. (Accessed October 21, 2016).  
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concentration.  Commitment to implementing some of these resolutions has been stronger than 
others.   
One approach outlined in the Agreement on Social and Economic Aspects and Agrarian 
Situation was to impose higher land taxes on under-utilized and un-utilized land, providing an 
economic incentive for large landowners to sell their underutilised holdings.71  Due to a lack of 
government commitment and powerful lobbying and misinformation campaigns by those who 
opposed taxation, an increased land tax has not yet been implemented in Guatemala.72 In regard 
to resettling displaced persons from the civil-war, the GoG agreed to promote the return of land 
to the original holders who were forced to abandon their land as a result of armed conflict.73 In 
all, some 31,000 refugees participated in the collective return process, which began in 1993 and 
drew to a close in 1998.  But because the recovery of original lands of displaced persons was 
difficult, due to irregularities in land tenancy before the abandonment or loss of documentation 
during the conflict, in general, those who returned earliest, when government and international 
attention was focused on these issues, were most successful in recovering property or receiving 
new lands.  Still, many resettlements remain unresolved.74 
Although several means for rectifying the land situation were mandated in the Peace 
Accords, the approach which has received the largest level of government commitment has been 
the market-led resolutions, specifically, the establishment of a land trust fund and the promotion 
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of land regularization.75  Together, these resolutions depoliticized agrarian reform and set up the 
requirement for the Guatemalan government to implement an MLAR.  In Section III, Article 33 
of the Agreement on Social and Economic Aspects and Agrarian Situation, the intentions and 
responsibilities of the land trust fund are explained: 
         The Government will take the following actions: 
Establish a land trust fund within a broad-based banking institution to provide credit 
and to promote savings, preferably among micro-, small and medium-sized 
enterprises. The land trust fund will have prime responsibility for the acquisition of 
land through Government funding, will promote the establishment of a transparent 
land market and will facilitate the updating of land development plans. The fund will 
give priority to the allocation of land to rural men and women who are organized for 
that purpose, taking into account economic and environmental sustainability 
requirements…76 
 
Ultimately, the final resolutions and the extent of commitment they received reflect the 
power dynamics which were re-negotiated during the peace process.  According to Granovsky-
Larsen, the results of the Peace Accords were swayed heavily by the influence of Guatemala’s 
elite and International Financial Institutions (IFIs) like the IMF and the WB. 77  The outcomes, 
specifically the inclusion of an MLAR became one of the most volatile issues in the Guatemalan 
Peace Accords and many organisations initially refused to even recognise the Agreement on the 
Social and Economic Aspects and Agrarian Situation.  The ASC did finally give its endorsement, 
but groups such as la Coordinadora Nacional Indígena y Campesina (CONIC) and COPMAGUA 
did so with considerable misgivings.78  Because of the inclusion of the MLAR and other market-
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oriented policies contained in the accords, experts have regarded these agreements as a 
“neoliberal peace,” a consolidation of neoliberalism through consent, or “a peace agreement that 
is more focused upon the creation of a market economy than on the equitable distribution of 
resources and power.”79   
 
FONTIERRAS and the Access to Land Program 
 
 
In May 1997, Guatemala’s MLAR began when the federal government established the 
Land Trust Fund.  Two years later, the Guatemalan congress formalized the operation of the 
fund, and on July 26, 2000 the WB officially made its first monetary contribution.80  The WB’s 
involvement and objectives in the program were to: 
assist the GoG to: (a) establish a program to facilitate beneficiaries' access to land; 
(b) support beneficiaries' access to technical assistance and productive subproject 
financing; and (c) improve the legal and institutional framework so that land markets 
can work more efficiently.81  
 
FONTIERRAS itself has many lengthy visions, missions, and objectives, but their primary goal 
is to, “support families to gradually become highly productive and competitive farmers and 
peasants, as the ideal way of combating poverty in the rural area of our country.”82  Three 
programs made up FONTIERRAS: the Access to Land Program, the Land Leasing Program, and 
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the Land Regularization Program. This chapter focuses on the operations and outcomes of the 
Access to Land Program.   
The Access to Land Program functioned by providing successful applicants with low-
interest loans for the purchase of land.  Although land purchased through the Land Fund was 
meant to come from several sources, including land given illegally to military officers during the 
conflict, unused state-owned land, and a limited number of expropriated properties as allowed 
under Article 40 of the constitution, FONTIERRAS has functioned mainly as a broker between 
large land-owners and landless, FONTIERRAS applicants.83  Those wishing to purchase land, 
first had to locate the land they wished to buy and then apply to FONTIERRAS for a loan.  
Loans were provided on a competitive basis which was determined by an assessed-ability for 
applicants to repay the loan.84  Land prices were negotiated directly between landowners and 
buyers and if applicants were successful in their loan application, the landowner would be fully 
compensated in cash for the amount agreed.85  The loans which FONTIERRAS provided had an 
interest rate of 2.85 % with a 4-year grace period and 5% interest after the grace period had 
ended.  Beneficiaries were also provided with subsidies and free legal and technical assistance 
for up to 3 years.86   
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Debt-Ridden Reform 
 
 
Between 1997 and 2011, 20,010 families purchased 264 farms, totalling 95,034.72 
hectares with the assistance of the Land Fund. 87  Although over 20,000 families acquiring land is 
a significant achievement, this success becomes much less impressive when considered 
alongside the total number of applicants. When viewed in this context, the Land Fund has 
provided for only a fraction of the total demand for land.  In 2002, CNOC identified that 
FONTIERRAS was unable to provide for more than 316,000 families who had applied for 
assistance.  CNOC predicted that, when taking into consideration the growth of the population 
without access to land, the unmet demand for land would continue to increase by more than 
8,000 per year.88  In 2006, high demand continued to be a challenge for the Land Fund, as 
acknowledged by the WB in their evaluation of their own involvement up until that point. 89  
According to the most recent information provided by FONTIERRAS, the unmet demand for 
land had grown to more than 480,000 rural families by 2011.90  This means that up until 2011, 
the Access to Land Program provided land for roughly 4% of those who had applied.  When 
compared to Guatemala’s state-led, agrarian reform which took place between the years of 1952 
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and 1954 (where 100,000 families received redistributed land in 2 years), the results of the 
MLAR become even less impressive, appearing to be both limited-in-reach and slow.91   
Who specifically were the beneficiaries of the Access to Land Program? According to 
FONTIERRAS’ own calculations, the Access to Land Program successfully met its mandate to 
provide land for Guatemala’s indigenous population, specifically.  Between the years of 1997 
and 2011, 80% percent of the 20,010 families who purchased land were indigenous.  The largest 
indigenous linguistic communities served were Q'eqchi at 70%, Quiché at 12%, Chuj at 6%, and 
Kaqchikel, also at 6%.92  This high representation appears to be a significant accomplishment 
since Guatemala’s indigenous populations have been the most poor, socially-excluded, and land-
poor populations in the country.  During colonization, indigenous populations were forcibly 
removed from their land and placed into centralized villages to ensure land and labor for the 
Guatemala’s elite.  After independence, they experienced further loss of land to private 
ownership and an expanding export agricultural industry.93  More recently, indigenous 
populations have been further displaced by civil-conflict, resource extraction, and efforts to 
preserve the environment.   
FONTIERRAS has a clear mandate to provide for Guatemala’s indigenous population.  
They maintained that they were committed to and respectful of the International Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, ratified in 1983, and operate in 
accordance with The Peace Accords’ Agreement on the Identity and Rights of Indigenous 
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persons.94  Special attention was given within the program to make Guatemala’s various 
indigenous groups aware of their services and included in the program.  Radio and television 
commercials were broadcasted nationally in Spanish as well as four prominent Mayan 
languages.95   
Although the FONTIERRAS was able to successfully support many indigenous 
applicants, it has not improved access to land overall for poor Guatemalans.  Beginning before 
the application process, only those able to bear the financial costs and time needed to search for 
farms which met the Land Trust’s requirements were able to place an application with 
FONTIERRAS.  Families that met this requirement were then evaluated on their socioeconomic 
capabilities. They were assessed for their “strengths” and “weaknesses” using a point system 
which categorized them as “optimal,” “regular,” (meeting the requirements), and “unfavorable” 
candidates for land credits.  Unfavorable candidates were viewed not to have the necessary 
training, finances, experience, or accompaniment of a peasant organization to be viable 
farmers.96  Essentially, the poor were considered unfavorable candidates and were systematically 
prevented from acquiring land through the Access to Land Program.  According to a CNOC 
                                                             
94 FONTIERRAS, “Mecanismos y Avances Institucionales en la Observancia y Aplicabilidad de los 
Derechos Humanos de Comunidades Indígenas,” 2012: 2; United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, “Seventh Periodic Report of States 
Parties Due in 1996: Guatemala,” 1996: 3. http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/3f4a07b50.pdf. 
95 FONTIERRAS, “Mecanismos y Avances Institucionales en la Observancia y Aplicabilidad de los 
Derechos Humanos de Comunidades Indigenas,”2012: 4. 
96 Conclusions based consultative workshops with 23 Land Fund beneficiary communities in four regions 
of the country (Petén, the Northern, Southern and Western regions) as well as eight community field visits, 
selected according to the following criteria to ensure a comparison of different situations: geographic 
location, membership or not of CNOC, different technical assistance firms and different phases in the land 
access process from: Coordinación de ONG y Cooperativas 
(CONGCOOP) “FONTIERRAS: El modelo de mercado y el acceso a la tierra en Guatemala. 
Balance y Perspectivas,” 2002: 14.  
33 
 
evaluation in 2002, the majority of those who received credit from the FONTIERRAS by that 
time were above the lowest socio-economic level.97 
For the same reason that FONTIERRAS has not provided for the poor, it has not 
provided for women.  Of the 20,010 families who purchased land as of February 2012, 17,811 of 
them have been headed by men.  Proportionally, land acquisition by sex within the program has 
been 89% male and 11% female (see Figure 2).98  This program has favoured men due to the 
competitive nature of the program itself and its inherent preference for financially-fit 
applicants.99  Rarely, are the most financially-fit applicants female.  This is because rural women, 
and even more so, indigenous women, possess less social and financial power than men, despite 
their important contributions to the family and their agricultural activities.   Indigenous women 
in Guatemala have one of the highest illiteracy rates in Latin America.   Often, they speak only 
their indigenous language, exacerbating their marginalization by excluding them from the formal 
education system.  Higher rates of poverty have further inhibited their ability to meet 
FONTIERRAS’ application requirements, affecting 75% of rural women and 80% of indigenous 
women. 100  
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Figure 2: FONTIERRAS’ Access to Land Program: Percentage of Participation by Sex 
from February 1998-2012  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  FONTIERRAS, “Programa De Acceso a la Tierra Porcentaje de Participación por Sexo de 1998 
a febrero 2012.”  
 
In 2010, FONTIERRAS implemented a Gender Equality Policy aimed to “ensure the 
permanent incorporation of women in the Land Fund.”101  Despite their efforts to resolve 
FONTIERRAS’ male preference, gender inequity persisted within the program, a trend reflective 
of land ownership patterns on the national level.  Since FONTIERRAS began, proportional land 
ownership by sex has changed only slightly, as demonstrated by data published by the UNDP.  In 
2000, women constituted 17% percent of Guatemala’s total land owners.  In 2002, women 
consisted just over 18%; and in 2004, 18.5% percent.102  More recently, FONTIERRAS made 
small improvements in this area in terms of providing land to women.  In the beginning of 2012, 
                                                             
101 FONTIERRAS, “Mecanismos y Avances institucionales en la observancia y aplicabilidad de los 
Derechos Humanos de Comunidades Indígenas,” 2012: 13. 
102 Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo (PNUD) Guatemala, “Estado para el Desarrollo 
Humano: Informe Nacional de Desarrollo Humano 2009-2010,” 287. 
35 
 
land acquisition according to sex became nearly equal, at almost 50% each.   This improvement 
was, however, short-lived since shortly thereafter the entire program was suspended.   
Of the 95,034.72 hectares which have been purchased with the assistance of 
FONTIERRAS, the majority of the land has been unfit for productive, agricultural activities. 
According to Granovsky-Larsen, the majority of farms sold through FONTIERRAS are found in 
two areas of Guatemala that are largely unsuitable for farming.   For example, 35% of farms 
which have been sold are on the south-west coast (See Figure 3).  This was once some of the 
most productive land in Guatemala, used for commercial agriculture; now, it is characterized by 
chemically-exhausted soil and neglected coffee plantations.103   Indicative of the poor quality of 
land being sold is the fact that many farms purchased through FONTIERRAS had already been 
abandoned by their previous owners.104 
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Figure 3: Territorial Distribution of Fincas Bought by the Land Fund 
 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  FONTIERRAS, “Mapa de Cobertura: Distribución territorial de Fincas compradas por el Fondo 
de Tierras,” 2012.  
 
In addition to purchased land being of poor quality, 31% of farms which were sold, 
through FONTIERRAS, in the northern lowlands, had limited infrastructure and no access to 
needed markets and services.105  In 2002, 56% percent of beneficiaries interviewed by 
CONGCOOP said they had insufficient access to markets to sell their crops.   One farm, for 
example, El Desconsuelo, had no access to water, making irrigation impossible.  It was 
accessible only by an 8-kilometre foot path and was situated on slopes of 45 degrees, making its 
soil susceptible to erosion.  El Desconsuelo was also purchased at an overvalued price.   Due to 
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these circumstances, the peasants who purchased the land could not achieve the productivity 
needed to repay their debts.   Even when infrastructure has existed, it has been reported that 
small farmers have sometimes been forced to abandon their land due to a combination of 
physical threats and "encirclement" (involving denial of access to farm-to market roads).106  
Another farm, acquired in 2004 by 52 families in the municipality of Champerico had 
land that was so poor in quality that, in addition to be being unable to make their debt payments, 
the new owners were experiencing “extreme poverty.”  According to one farmer, the community 
was “living in extreme poverty because the estate…[was] not suitable for basic grains and 
vegetables that allow the survival of the people who inhabit that territory.”  In this case, the farm 
that was purchased was polluted by the previous owner who grew cotton.107 
Beneficiaries’ ability to repay FONTIERRAS for their loans and achieve profitability has 
also been conditioned by the high price beneficiaries have paid for land.  As a result of high 
demand for land, low supply, and inequality in the negotiation process, the price for land which 
beneficiaries paid, was often higher than any realistic assessment of “fair” market value.  This 
put the majority of beneficiaries into positions where they could not repay their loans and have 
lost the land they recently acquired.  In 2002, 60% of beneficiaries were using their subsidies for 
payments towards their debt.108  And in 2005, CNOC reported that at least 40% of farmers were 
having difficulty making their loan repayments.109  According to CONGCOOP, by 2002, the 
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majority of farms purchased had not yet achieved profitability.110  Even in 2006, 8 years after the 
first farms were acquired and after years of free technical service and subsidies, the WB reported 
that average land productivity had not yet increased.  The WB explained that they believed 
profitability had not yet been achieved due to a lack of technical assistance and a lack of capital 
investment to restore land productivity.  They expected that over more time, the productivity of 
land would improve, but in a small number of cases the levels of land productivity would not be 
sufficient to cover the requirements for repayment of land purchase credits.111   But this was not 
the case.  By April 25, 2011, 14,000 families, over half of the total beneficiaries, from 139 farms, 
failed to make payments on their debt, which then totalled over 333.9 million Quetzales.112   This 
debt was one of the motivations for the Indigenous Peasant and Popular March when tens of 
thousands of Guatemalans marched 214 kilometres to the capital to voice their demands for 
farm-debt cancellation and an end to forced evictions in March of 2012.113 
 Despite the MLAR’s supposed ability to limit corruption by removing the state from the 
reform process, FONTIERRAS has been accused of and found guilty of corruption on several 
occasions.  The majority of these allegations have been related to the purchasing of overpriced 
farms.  On July 7, 2003, La Prensa Libre reported on an alleged corrupt purchasing of several 
overpriced farms using FONTIERRAS credit (Finca La Cresta, EI Estor, Izabal; and Finca EI 
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Desconsuelo, Cahabon, Alta Verapaz).  Again, on March 22, 2004, the same paper reported on 
corrupt deals between FONTIERRAS officials and landowners to sell farms at inflated prices 
using “bogus documents” (Finca Los Andes, San Luis, Peten).  Because of these allegations, 
FONTIERRAS set up the Control and Verification Commission (Comisión de Control y 
Verificación) that same year. Despite this new commission, corruption continued within 
FONTIERRAS.  In 2006, for example, the Constitutional Court ruled in favor of a landowner in 
San Luis, Petén whose farm was sold by FONTIERRAS even though he had not put it on the 
market.114  
It is a bit more difficult to determine to what extent the reform has affected those in 
poverty, which was, of course, the WB’s main selling-point for the MLAR. What we do know, 
however, is that many who received land through the program, also became poorer as a result of 
the debt they assumed.  In 2003, the WB reported that 79% of families on land sold by 
FONTIERRAS lived in extreme poverty and a further 17% in non-extreme poverty.115  It is also 
impossible to isolate the reform from other factors, so as to measure its effect on poverty 
nationally.  Again, what we do know is that poverty has increased both proportionately and in 
total in Guatemala during the time the Access to Land Program operated.  In 2006, 51% of 
Guatemalans lived below the poverty line and in 2014 the percentage had grown to 59%.116 
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Inherent Limitations, Insufficient Capacity, Deficient Implementation, and Unfavorable 
Conditions 
 
 
 What explains the limited success of FONTIERRAS? And what explains the enormous 
indebtedness created by this program?  Indeed, much of the reform’s outcomes can be attributed 
to the MLAR’s basic assumption that land is solely an economic factor of production, 
overlooking all social, political, religious, environmental, ethnic, and rights-based 
considerations.   But these inherent limitations were also compounded by less obvious reasons: 
FONTIERRAS’ insufficient capacity, deficient implementation, and unfavorable conditions.  
First, FONTIERRAS’ limited ability to redistribute land or affect poverty rates can be 
partly explained by its dependence on voluntary land transfers. In Guatemala, land is extremely 
valuable.  In addition to providing subsistence, land provides power, security, status, and 
personal and family meaning.117  Due to low land taxes, landowners have had few incentives to 
sell their land. 118  Since 1936, underutilized and idle, large, landholdings have been legally 
subject to taxation, but due to an inability/unwillingness to pass legislation and implement higher 
taxation or enforce existing legislation, the taxation of land has been unable to encourage 
voluntary land sales.119  As a result, only a small number farms were voluntarily placed on the 
market. 
Also conditioning the Land Fund’s ability to facilitate access has been its limited capacity 
to function as required.  Many organizations have reported that The Land Funds’ budget was 
much too small.  In 2009, the Guatemalan newspaper, elPeriodico, reported that FONTIERRAS 
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not only had insufficient funds to provide credit, but they could not pay their employees. Well 
after a month of work, employees had not received compensation due to budget constraints.120   
Several independent assessments, throughout the programs’ operations, have also brought 
to light FONTIERRAS’ frequent failure to deliver information, subsidies, and technical 
assistance to its beneficiaries in a timely matter.  In CONGCOOP’s 2002 study of the reform 
which involved beneficiary interviews, 35% percent of beneficiaries interviewed were unsure 
about information related to their incurred debt, 47% had no accurate information regarding 
interest amounts, and 46% were unsure about payment deadlines.121  According to the same 
report, in 1998, subsidies were delivered, on average, 7 months after land was purchased.  By 
2001, subsidy delays improved, but remained late, averaging a delay of 4 months. 122 
Insufficient and changing commitment to the program has also had an impact on its 
success.  In the program’s first few years, the Minister of Agriculture was replaced 6 times, 
causing significant changes and policy reversals affecting “the implementation of the Land Fund 
and compromising its longer-term strategies and sustainability,” according to the WB.123 
Existing conditions throughout Guatemala have also impeded FONTIERRAS’ success.  
Drought and the international coffee crisis that began in 1999-2000 had a significant impact on 
the income of coffee farmers, making it difficult for farmers to repay their loans and make the 
required productive investments.124  As such, FONTIERRAS’ success has also been dependent 
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on strong agricultural prices.  In 2006, Guatemala signed on to the Dominican Republic–Central 
America Free Trade Agreement (DR-CAFTA).  This free trade agreement opened-up new 
competition in agricultural markets, resulting in a reduction in the prices of many crops and a 
loss of 40,000-125,000 agricultural jobs in Guatemala.125  Earlier structural adjustment 
programs, also had a negative effect on farmers during the MLAR, since previously available 
government assistance from the public agricultural sector had been eliminated.  Reduced 
government spending has also restricted the government’s ability to facilitate the acquisition of 
land by other means.  As a result, FONTIERRAS’ became one of the main methods for acquiring 
land, and was overrun with demand. 126    
In response to the growing debt, the unsustainability of the program, and accusations of 
corruption, FONTIERRAS rejected an additional loan from the WB and suspended its Access to 
Land Program recently, shifting their focus instead, to their Land Leasing Program.  
 
Conclusions 
 
 
 The Access to Land Program has, in no way, achieved what it set out to do.  
FONTIERRAS indeed facilitated the purchasing of land for thousands of Guatemalans, but not 
for the poor and not for women.  Moreover, despite the WB’s claims that the MLAR was more 
efficient at distributing land than state-led reforms, the Guatemalan case proved otherwise.  In 
regard to total demand for land and in comparison to the reform of 1952-1954, this MLAR has 
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had only marginal results.   Due to low taxes on idle land and the voluntary nature of the model, 
there have been insufficient incentives for landowners to sell their land.  Those who have sold, 
have sold mainly unfit land that was already abandoned or found in isolated locations without 
access to services.  FONTIERRAS’ limited capacity, deficient implementation, and corruption 
further reduced the success of the program by allowing farms to be purchased at excessively high 
prices.  External processes such has trade liberalization and low agricultural prices also did not 
help beneficiaries.  Because of these combined circumstances, many peasants have been unable 
to achieve subsistence, let alone the productivity required to repay the loans they received from 
FONTIERRAS.   In sum, attempting to affect land distribution by improving access to land via 
the provision of credit and financial and technical assistance has not brought about the expected 
outcomes. The Access to Land Program has only allowed for the conditional and temporary 
access to low-quality land for few Guatemalans which has come at the cost of huge beneficiary 
indebtedness, increased poverty, and the suspension of the Access to Land Program altogether.  
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CHAPTER 3 Legal Displacement and the Solidification of Historical 
Inequalities: FONTIERRAS’ Land Regularization Program 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
 Another essential component of the MLAR model is land title regularization which, 
according to FONTIERRAS, is the process of analysing, reviewing, mapping, and awarding land 
title for existing land ownership.127  This has been executed through cadastral surveying, 
developing a legal, land title registry, and simplifying land registration procedures.  Land 
regularization does not redistribute land or improve access to land directly.  In most cases, 
people who have obtained land titles through the program were not new landowners, but people 
already living on those lands for which they received title.  Land title regularization is, however, 
believed to improve tenure security, and in doing so, improve the functioning of the land market, 
leading to more simplified land transfers, better land distribution, economic development, 
poverty alleviation, and a reduction in land-related conflicts.  These presumed outcomes of land 
regularization were consistent with the GoGs’ priorities during the peace negotiations, and 
because of this, legal reform and the titling of land were mandated in the 1996 Peace Accords.  
This chapter focuses on two particular aspects of land regularization: rural land surveying and 
rural land titling which was overseen by FONTIERRAS through its State Land Regularization 
Program (Programa de Regularización de Tierras del Estado).  Between the years of 2000 and 
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2011, FONTIERRAS issued 19,254 rural land titles which covered 737,337 hectares of land in 
Guatemala.128   
This chapter begins by exploring the origins and evolving motives of land regularization 
in order to understand how it became an important component of the MALR. The results of the 
program are then presented and examined against the assumptions which justified the model.  
Over the course of 11 years, The Land Regularization Program titled a significant amount of 
rural land in Guatemala, but rather than providing tenure security and reducing poverty and 
conflict, the program has facilitated further displacement and the re-concentration of land.  
 
The World Bank, Land Titling, and the Peace Accords 
 
 
 Since the 1970s, land titling has been an important development strategy in the Global 
South.  On many occasions, the WB has taken an active role in promoting this strategy.   
Throughout the 70s and 80s, when the WB began its shift from project funding (eg: dams, 
highways, power plants) to policy funding, the WB funded many land tilting programs in 
countries such as Colombia, Brazil, Thailand, and Malawi.  At this time, these programs were 
carried out with objectives of preventing the environmental degradation of common land.129  
Two works, in particular, influenced the WB and their policies by reframing the problem of 
communally held land from being one of “underproduction” to one of “exploitation.”   H. Scott 
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Gordon’s 1954 “The Economic Theory of a Common Property Resource: The Fishery” and 
Grarrett Hardin’s 1968 “Tragedy of the Commons” both made the case that communal resources 
inevitably lead to over-exploitation and degradation.130  Although Gordon wrote about a 
particular common resource—the fishery—he argued that all communally-owned natural 
resources would be exploited as a result of individualistic competition.131  These two arguments, 
although completely speculative, inspired 30 years of land privatization programs which were 
implemented to prevent what was presumed to be the inevitable “tragedy of the commons”.   
By the 1990s, environmental concerns (although not forgotten) were overshadowed by 
economic concerns.   Influenced by the return to liberalism, land titling was reframed as a 
precondition for stable economic development.  The privatization of land was believed to allow 
for land to be better and more efficiently used.  Evidence of this shift in justification can be seen 
in the WB’s land titling programs of the 1990s.  At this time the Bank assured that land titling 
would reduce the cost of land transactions, provide security for credit, support land and property 
taxation, and increase investment into land, thereby facilitating growth and development. 132    
Again in 2000 another transformative piece, re-legitimized and stimulated an acceleration 
of land titling programs to such an extent that this period has been called “the property 
revolution” or even “the de Sotoan revolution.”133  In 2000, Hernando de Soto published The 
Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere Else which 
built on his earlier work The Other Path: The Economic Answer to Terrorism.  In these works, 
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de Soto claimed a direct correlation between property ownership and wealth, emphasizing that 
insecure property rights weaken the incentives for owners to make long-term investments and 
impede landowners’ ability to use their property to secure loans to finance investment. Without 
access to credit and an ability to invest in land, economic growth and development would be 
impossible.134    
Most recently, the purported benefits of land titling have expanded to include poverty 
alleviation and conflict reduction.  Inspired by these ideas, land titling programs have been 
promoted by the WB and international development agencies on these grounds as well.  
According to the WB: 
Land is a critically important asset that underpins most economic activities. Land use 
and land rights are central to the work of the World Bank Group and to eradicating 
poverty, building shared prosperity, and fostering private investment and gender 
equality. 
 
In recent years, there has been increasing awareness of the relevance of land tenure 
issues to food security, climate change, rapid urbanization, informality and 
indigenous people’s rights.135 
 
Similar rationale, which presumes land regularization promotes development and protects 
peasants was also incorporated into the Agreement on the Socio-economic Aspects and Agrarian 
Situation:  
37. Guatemala is in need of reform of the juridical framework of agriculture and 
institutional development in the rural sector so that an end can be put to the lack of 
protection and dispossession from which small farmers, and in particular indigenous 
peoples, have suffered, so as to permit full integration of the rural population into the 
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national economy and regulate land use in an efficient and environmentally 
sustainable manner in accordance with development needs. To this end, and taking 
into account in all cases the provisions of the Agreement on Identity and Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples, the Government undertakes to:  
 
  
a) Promote a legal reform which will establish a juridical framework governing land 
ownership that is secure, simple and accessible to the entire population. This 
reform will need to simplify the procedures for awarding title and registering 
ownership and other real estate rights, as well as to simplify administrative and 
judicial formalities and procedures…. 
 
g)  Regulate the award of title to the lands of indigenous communities and   
    beneficiaries of the Guatemalan Institute for Agrarian Reform who are in lawful      
    possession of the land assigned to them.136 
 
 
FONTIERRAS and the State Land Regularization Program 
 
 
In 1999, FONTIERRAS began its mandate to survey and title rural land through its Land 
Regularization Program.  The funding for these programs came from the IBRD, a WB Institution 
under the title of The Land Fund Project (IBRD Loan No. 4432).  Separate land titling programs 
occurred alongside the Land Regularization Program such as the WB-supported Land 
Administration Project (IBRD Loan No.4415) which operated primarily in Petén and a separate 
land titling program which focused on urban land titling.  These projects were said to be 
separately funded and implemented so as to generate more accurate information.  FONTIERRAS 
was responsible not only for issuing title, but for adjudicating applications for title through a 
lengthy process which included: reviewing required documents (identification, birth certificates 
etc.), determining that there were no existing boundary disputes, inspecting the land, surveying 
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the land, and then registering the land.137  Special attention, within the program, was to be given 
to both women and indigenous peoples who were traditionally excluded from the land 
ownership.  
In 1998, when the land titling initiative began, it was reported that only 30% of the 
Guatemala’s properties were registered, though the majority of these properties were located in 
urban areas.  According to USAID, only 5% of land in rural Guatemala had been registered by 
this time.138  Many factors explain this, including the absence of a legal framework for a national 
cadastre, a poorly functioning and highly centralized Registro General de Propiedad (RGP) 
which was established during the colonial era and was never modernized, and the preference for 
informal land transfers without proper registration due to the land transfer process being 
complex, expensive, and excessively bureaucratic for both sellers and buyers.139   
Over the course of 11 years, from 2000-2011, FONTIERRAS issued 19,254 titles, 
covering 737,337 hectares of land.140  Titles were issued to both individuals and groups with 
17,992 land titles issued to individuals and 1,262 land titles issued to groups. In total, 60,418 
families received titles to their land through the program.  Both women and men equally partook 
in the program, seen both by number of total applicants as well as in the number of individual 
titles provided to women in comparison to just men.  According to FONTIERRAS, 64% of the 
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total number of titles issued, were issued to indigenous individuals or groups.141  But in terms of 
total individuals who received title, indigenous recipients constituted 86% of the total population.  
This can be explained by the fact that more collective titles were given to indigenous applicants, 
allowing for more indigenous families to receive title through the program.  In regard to total 
hectares titled to indigenous and non-indigenous beneficiaries, 91% of the total land titled 
through this project was titled to indigenous persons.   
In light of the objectives of the program, the Land Regularization Program has achieved 
only a fraction of their land titling goals.  Quantitatively, their goal was to title 50% of the 
country by 2013.142   Yet, by 2010, only 3% of the target area was titled. 143  In contrast, the 
program has been much more successful with respect to their cadastral surveying goals.  By 
2010, 64% of the target for cadastral surveying in rural areas was met.  Though the program has 
not yet achieved its primary quantitative goals, to what extent has the limited land regularization 
which has occurred produced its expected outcomes?  
 
False-Assumptions and Unmet Objectives 
 
 
The Land Regularization Program was implemented with the expectation that it would 
resolve problems and achieve specific goals.  As mentioned, these goals were increased access to 
credit for land owners, a reduction in conflict, growth, and increased tenure security.  It is 
important to note that is difficult to determine the extent to which the Land Regularization 
Program has produced these outcomes since neither the WB nor FONTIERRAS made adequate 
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provision for impact evaluation.144 Overall, the WB reported that the outcomes of the Land 
Regularization Program were “moderately unsatisfactory” stating that one of the “lessons 
learned” was that assumptions regarding the benefits of land titling need to be examined and 
tested with empirical evidence.145  The following analysis utilizes what data is available to 
evaluate the programs’ performance against land regularization’s purported benefits.   
Although the Land Regularization Program was meant to “simplify the procedures for 
awarding title and registering ownership,” the new application process was not especially simple 
or financially accessible for applicants.  According to USAID, the high up-front cost of this 
process was a significant barrier for applicants.  In addition to the substantial cost and time 
needed to gather documents required for the application, applicants also had to also pay notary 
fees and fees to register their land. 146  
Land titling was also implemented under the assumption that possessing a title to land 
would improve a landowner’s access to credit.  Although the rationale correctly acknowledges 
that banks require capital to secure loans, it assumes that peasants do not already have their own 
well-developed systems of credit-supply.147  Moreover, the provision of land title alone does not 
necessarily improve access to credit.  Additional factors, including interest rates, also affect 
access to credit from banks.  During the program’s operations, Guatemalan Banks had interest 
rates that were ranging from 18 to 26%, per year (usurers’ rates were as high as 120% in 2011).  
Regardless of landowner’s acquisition of legal title to their land, interest rates either inhibited 
peasants from applying for credit altogether, or led to many losing their land when they were 
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unable to cope with the debt.148  Evidence also suggests that a lack of title may not have limited 
peasants’ access to credit originally.  Additional data on this subject comes from Francisco J. 
Perez, who between 2002 and 2003, surveyed 48 families in Alta Verapaz who received land 
titles from FONTIERRAS.  His research concluded that prior to having title, the lack of title had 
not impeded these families’ access to credit and that, after title was received, there was a 
reduction in access to credit because credit terms had become less favorable.149  Although 
processing title to land has the potential to increase a landowner’s access to credit, the provision 
of land title alone did not necessarily result in improved access to credit for those who received 
title through the Land Regularization Program. 
Land titling, as part of an MLAR, was also assumed to be more peaceful than state-led 
reforms.  Furthermore, it was believed that titling land would reduce conflicts generated by 
unclear tenure.150  Again, it is difficult to measure to what extent the reform has affected land-
related conflicts because the collection and analysis of land dispute data is a relatively new 
phenomenon in Guatemala.  In 1997, the Presidential Land Office for Conflict Resolution 
(CONTIERRA), was created, and since then, this office has worked to monitor and mediate 
land-related conflicts.  CONTIERRA characterizes land disputes as either: “Disputes over 
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Competing Property Rights,” “Occupations of Property Legally Owned by Another,” or 
“Boundary Disputes.”151  
 According CONTIERRA, during the reform, the number of reported land disputes rose 
sharply from less than 100 in 1997 to almost 700 reported cases in 2006 (see Figure 4).  
Although these land disputes were not as widespread as witnessed during the civil-war, there has 
been a significant increase in localized, land disputes.  By 2003, it was reported that active 
disputes had reached 2077 cases.152  Though CONTIERRA indicates that registered land 
conflicts increased during FONTIERRAS’ operations, it could actually be that the number of 
cases of conflict over land remained constant (or were even in decline) over this period.  
Nevertheless, key land experts have stated that the total number of registered land disputes has 
been understated, suggesting that tens of thousands of additional disputes remain latent or 
unregistered.153   
Still, an increase in reported land disputes is not necessarily a negative outcome of the 
MLAR, since it has allowed the opportunity for these land disputes to be addressed.  By March 
2007, CONTIERRA reported that they had resolved 88% of the rural land conflicts which were 
registered.154 At first glance, the resolution of land disputes appears to be a success, but 
according to USAID, the majority of the land disputes resolved by CONTIERRA were achieved 
through land purchases, especially via FONTIERRAS, which has not been a sustainable 
resolution to land conflicts, and, as indicated in the previous chapter, is an approach which has 
caused widespread beneficiary debt.155  What we also know is that some land disputes registered 
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with CONTIERRA were a direct result of the Land Regularization Program.  According to the 
WB, at least 15% of conflicts reported to CONTIERRA were triggered by the regularization 
process itself.156    
 
Figure 4: Reported Cases of Land Conflict in Guatemala (January- October 2009) 
 
 
 
 
Source:  The World Bank, “World Bank Support to Land Administration 
and Land Redistribution in Central America Report No.: 55341 An IEG Performance Assessment of 
Three Projects: El Salvador, Land Administration Project (Loan No. 3982) Guatemala, Land 
Administration Project (Loan No. 4415) Guatemala, Land Fund Project (Loan No. 4432) June 30, 2010,” 
8.  Based on data from Secretaria de Asuntos Agrarias January-October 2009.  
 
 
 
State-sanctioned violence and evictions against those opposing the rapid accumulation of 
land, owing, in part, to the MLAR, has also increased recently.  Although there has not been an 
extensive study on land evictions, a study by Camilo Salvadó of the AVANCSO research 
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institution suggests that the government of President Álvaro Colom carried out 99 violent 
evictions between 2008 and 2010.157   
One particularly, well-known, eviction took place in 2011 in the Polochic Valley of 
Panzós, Alta Verapaz.  Prior to this eviction, this area was populated by Q´eqchi´ families who 
were in negotiations to buy the land their families had farmed for centuries with the assistance of 
FONTIERRAS.  In 2010, the Widdmans Family, placed a higher bid for the same land and were 
successful in purchasing the 5,400 hectares for the “Chabil Utzaj” sugar mil.  Because the local 
indigenous communities believed they had a right to live and work on the land, they occupied 14 
of the estates in November of 2010.  In March of 2011, Guatemalan soldiers and police, 
reportedly numbering over 2000, forcefully evicted 700 families from the contested land, 
destroying homes with chainsaws.   Houses and crops were burned and 3 farmers were killed.158  
Similar violent evictions have been carried across Guatemala, especially in Alta Verapaz 
and surrounding the Fenix nickel mine in El Estor.  In 2006 and 2007, families were forcibly 
evicted from their homes on contested land surrounding the nickel mine.  The Canadian mining 
company responsible for these violent evictions, Hudbay Minerals, is still involved in ongoing 
lawsuits in Canadian courts regarding the brutal killing of Adolfo Ich Chamán, in 2009 and the 
raping of 11 women from Lote Ocho by mining company personnel during a forced eviction in 
2007.159 
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Besides violent evictions, indigenous groups and social organizations have been 
increasingly repressed, criminalized, and murdered for their opposition to continued 
displacement and forced evictions.  The CUC, for example, an organization which represents 
over 200 communities, and advocates for rights to land, water and food sovereignty for 
impoverished peasant communities, has suffered many attacks and over 44 assassinations of its 
members between 2000 and 2014.160  In sum, land regularization has probably not led to a 
reduction in land-based conflicts and in some ways has actually contributed to increased violence 
in Guatemala.  
Land registration and titling have long been seen as an important mechanism for 
increasing tenure security; yet, for many who received land title, their recent formalized land 
ownership has only been temporary.  According to information gathered by Laura Hurtado Paz y 
Paz and Liza Grandia, following the titling processes (and often during them) in Petén, agro-
industrial companies and land speculator-intermediaries approached many of the new Q’eqchi’ 
land owners and offered them unprecedented amounts of money for their land.161  Beneficiaries 
were left vulnerable and many who had recently received land title were pressured and 
intimidated by prospective buyers into selling their land.  According to the testimony of a 
Q’eqchi’ peasant from a village in el Petén: 
many of those refusing to sell [were] harassed and threatened by armed‐bullies 
working as “private security” paratroops for the agribusinesses in ways like, ‘if you 
don´t sell at the price we are offering you, we will have to deal with the widow 
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instead.’ 162 
 
Many who received land titles from FONTIERRAS have also lost their land out of an 
inability to afford it.   According to research collected by Alonso-Fradejas, when male heads-of-
households were surveyed in the northern lowlands in 2010, 50% of the surveyed men who lost 
their land which they received official title to through the Land Regularization Program in the 
previous 10 years said they were “forced” to sell their land.  Another 30% said they sold it 
because it was “useless for farming” and the rest because they were “highly indebted.”163 
As a result of being bought-out, coerced into selling, or indebted, many who received title 
through the Land Regularization Program no longer own their land.  In the municipality of 
Chisec, Alta Verapaz, Hurtado Paz y Paz found that between 22% and 63% of peasants in 7 
communities sold their land following the FONTIERRAS title regularization process.164  On 
March 12, 2009,  one of Guatemala’s daily newspapers SigloXXI, reported that according to one 
peasant leader from Poptún, Petén, the majority of those who received title to their land though 
FONTIERRAS in the 39 communities have sold their lands.165 The WB discovered similar 
outcomes in their project evaluation, which stated that within 5 years of the project terminating, 
at least 46% of those who received title to their land no longer owned their land.166  In sum, the 
titling of land alone has not led to increased tenure security, decreased violence, or an increase in 
access to credit for beneficiaries as expected.  Instead, because of the GoG’s inability to protect 
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beneficiaries from extra-economic coercion (e.g. physical intimidation or expropriation without 
compensation) or ensure that beneficiaries could maintain their land ownership sustainably, land 
has been legally, although not always legitimately sold, leaving peasants again without land.   
 
Facilitating the Export Boom through Legal Displacement 
 
Land titling was also prescribed for Guatemala due to its assumed ability to promote 
growth; this in fact, did occur.  During Guatemala’s MLAR, the economy grew nearly threefold.  
Between 2000 and 2014, Guatemala’s GDP grew from 19.29 billion United States Dollars 
(USD) to just under 60 billion USD. 167  Much of this economic growth can be attributed to an 
expansion in Guatemala’s ago-export economy, specifically the growth in sugar and palm oil 
production to meet the increasing global demand for ethanol.   
 The recent growth in the global demand for ethanol has had a significant impact on land 
use, access to food, and land distribution in Guatemala.  According to Oxfam International, the 
cultivated area dedicated to palm oil in Guatemala quadrupled between 2003 and 2012 from 
30,000 hectares to over 120,000 hectares (see Figure 5).168  This has equated to 80,000 tons of 
palm oil produced in 2003 to 180,000 tons in 2010 (see Figure 6).  Sugar cultivation has also 
expanded more recently.  While sugar production accounted for 3.4% of the total agricultural 
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area in 1980, it has grown to utilize 14% of arable land in 2008.  That same year, Guatemala 
became the second largest exporter of sugar in Latin America and the Caribbean and number 
three in the world. 169  In 2010, Guatemala produced 248,000 hectares of sugarcane and 102,000 
hectares of oil palm.170  Based on total arable land in Guatemala, which was 1,500,000 hectares 
in 2010, palm oil and sugarcane production together has grown to utilize roughly 30% or total 
arable land in Guatemala.171   
 
Figure 5:  Evolution of the Area Under Palm Oil Cultivation in Guatemala (2003-2012)  
 
 
Source: Arantxa Guereña and Ricardo Zepeda, “The Power of Oil Palm: Land Grabbing and Impacts 
Associated with the Expansion of Oil Palm Crops in Guatemala: The Case of the Palmas del Ixcán 
Company,” Oxfam America Backgrounder Series (2013), 18. 
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Global demand for ethanol continues to drive land acquisition in Guatemala. As we can see in 
Figure 6, the majority of palm oil grown in Guatemala, has not been for local consumption. 
 
Figure 6: Production and Export of Palm Oil in Guatemala (1993-2010) 
 
 
 
Source: Arantxa Guereña and Ricardo Zepeda, “The Power of Oil Palm: Land Grabbing and Impacts 
Associated with the Expansion of Oil Palm Crops in Guatemala: The Case of the Palmas del Ixcán 
Company,” Oxfam America Backgrounder Series (2013), 18.  
 
A few circumstances in particular have facilitated the recent accumulation of land by the 
agro-export industry—weak governance and the Land Regularization Program itself.  Perhaps 
somewhat paradoxically, weak land governance has attracted recent investment in Guatemala.  
Although secure property rights is often asserted to be a precondition for foreign-direct 
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investment, IMF and WB economists have found that countries with weak land sector 
governance are most attractive to investors because land can be obtained quickly and cheaply.172  
 The Land Regularization Program itself, has also contributed to the acceleration of land 
sales in Guatemala; first, because the law regulating the Land Fund eliminated provisions 
regarding the state’s responsibility to prohibit newly-titled land from being purchased for 10 
years.173  Next, through its cadastral surveying, parcels of land became legible and land owners, 
visible, for the first time to outside investors.  According to Scott, “land maps in general and 
cadastral maps in particular are designed to make the local situation legible to an outsider.”  For 
purely local purposes, cadastral mapping is often redundant.174 This would seem true for 
Guatemala as well since surveying the countryside has benefited outsiders more than those who 
initially received title to their land.   
Furthermore, land titling has allowed for previously inaccessible land to be available for 
purchase on the market. Based on research by Alonso-Fradejas, most of the land recently 
acquired for palm oil production in Guatemala’s northern lowlands was originally titled by 
FONTIERRAS.175  Oxfam International has also observed how FONTIERRAS has benefited 
palm oil producers, reporting that one of the main palm oil companies in Guatemala, Palmas del 
Ixcán, was encouraging FONTIERRAS to promote land titling in areas which interested them. 176  
Undeniably, the areas of land regularization and suitable land for palm oil cultivation 
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considerably overlap, as demonstrated in Figure 7. 
 
Figure 7: Areas of Land Regularization and Potential Land for Cultivating Palm Oil 
 
 
Source:  Laura Hurtado Paz y Paz, “Las plantaciones para agrocombustibles y la pérdida de tierras para la 
producción de alimentos en Guatemala,” [Biofuel plantations and reduction of land for food production in 
Guatemala] Guatemala: ActionAid Guatemala, 2008. 
 
 
Inequitable Growth  
 
 
While the WB believed that increased investment and the expansion of the agro-export 
industry would create jobs, growth and alleviate poverty, with the exception of growth, this has 
not yet materialized in Guatemala.  Even though growth has indeed occurred, the benefits of this 
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growth have been highly concentrated. Only 14 companies—owned by 14 oligarchic families—
make up the powerful Sugar Producers’ Guild (ASAZGUA), and control over 80% of the 
country’s sugar plantations and 100% of the sugar mills.  Similarly, 8 families form the 
influential Oil Palm Growers’ Guild (GREPALMA), and control 98% of the harvested oil palm 
and 100% of the palm oil mills in Guatemala.177 
In addition to being inequitable, this growth has come at the expense of subsistence 
agriculture and peasant livelihoods. Throughout the period of rapid land accumulation, 
production of basic foods has decreased.  Basic grain production per person and per year has 
decreased from 155 kilograms in 1993 to 125 kilograms in 2007.178  Staple crops such as corn 
and beans have also dropped in production recently.  Between 1990 and 2004, corn production 
decreased by 15.7% and bean production by 17.8%.  Wheat and rice production also dropped 
64.6% and 21.4% respectively between 1990 and 2004.179  Together the palm oil businesses 
occupy an area in plantations equivalent to the land used by more than 60,000 subsistence 
farmers.180 Studies from the northern lowlands have shown that the growth of export agriculture 
and reduction in staple crop production is more than a correlation.  In this study, as much as 23% 
of the lands used for oil palm production in 2010 were previously owned by small cultivators to 
grow staple foods in 2005.181   
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Besides losing land and access to subsistence growing, many peasants have found 
themselves with less employment opportunities since palm oil plantations in Guatemala’s 
northern lowlands generate few jobs.  Palm oil, for instance, requires 52 working days per 
hectare per year, as opposed to maize, which requires 112 working days.182 As seen in Figure 8, 
palm oil production provides some of the lowest employment opportunities when compared to 
traditional exports like coffee and bananas or staple crops such as maize. 
 
Figure: 8 Employment Creation by Type of Production Cultivated in Guatemala 
 
Source: USAID, “Optimizing the Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction Benefits of CAFTA-DR,” 
2008, 95. http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/Pnadm562.pdf (Accessed October 21 2016).  
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The World Bank and Its Conflict of Interest 
 
Although the Land Regularization Program has not met most its objectives, the MLAR in 
many ways has complimented and has facilitated other WB objectives.  The WB is a group of 
institutions, lending to both private companies and public governments. While the Bank was 
lending to support Guatemala’s MLAR which was meant to increase access to land and reduce 
poverty and conflict, its private sector lending arm, The International Development Association 
(IDA), was also lending to support mining and agro-export industries in Guatemala.  Lending to 
these industries, according to the WB, was driven by the Bank’s broader commitment to reduce 
poverty and promote economic development.183  But these industries have often displaced and 
further impoverished Guatemalans.  And in some cases, these industries have directly impeded 
the MLAR’s success.   
In 2004, the IDA lent money to Glamis Gold Ltd., a Canadian-American corporation, to 
re-open the Marlin mine in the Department of San Marcos. According to local population, this 
mine was re-opened without adequate consultation.  Additionally, disagreements over land 
acquisition and the failure of the company to address risks associated with the mine has led to 
opposition from local communities. This opposition has been met with threats, acts of 
intimidation, and attacks which have resulted in injuries and death.184  In 2011, the UN Special 
Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous peoples stated that the presence of large scale mining 
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has, “generated a highly unstable atmosphere of social conflict which is having a serious impact 
on the rights of the indigenous people and threatening the country’s governance and economic 
development.”185  In 2013, the government declared a state of emergency in some areas affected 
by protests against mining, a measure which is normally used in times of war or when natural 
disasters occur.186  
The WB also continues to finance the sugar industry in Guatemala which, as previously 
discussed, continues to legally, but not legitimately, acquire vast amounts of land in Guatemala, 
undermining various rights and government obligations.   In 2009 IDA financed another loan to 
increase the capacity at the Pantaleon sugar mill in Guatemala.187  
 
Conclusions 
 
The initiative to survey and title land through the Land Regularization Program failed to 
achieve the majority of its objectives.  Rather than meeting its purportedly self-evident goals 
(improving access to credit for land owners, reducing conflict, and increasing tenure security), 
this program, which was based on false assumptions and informed by a flawed understanding of 
the history of agrarian reform, has maintained the status quo.  Indeed, the expected impact that 
land regularization would have on the poor was overestimated and the lack of land title proved to 
be less of a barrier to tenure security and poverty alleviation than predicted.  In effect, the 
program benefited Guatemala’s elite and further marginalized and displaced Guatemala’s poor. 
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Through the mapping and titling of rural Guatemala, the regularization process has made 
previously inaccessible land visible and available for purchase and while leaving new holders of 
land title exposed and vulnerable.   Further impacting the Land Regularization program was 
corruption, collusion, weak land governance, and the growing, global demand for ethanol.  
Because of these combined conditions, large amounts of land have been legally, but not 
legitimately, acquired, undermining local rights and obligations for short-term profits—a process 
experts call “land grabbing.” Those who have resisted this process have been repressed, 
criminalized, evicted and in some cases murdered, meaning that land regularization has neither 
been an especially peaceful process.  Finally, because this recent accumulation has occurred 
legally, the program has ensured that future restitution and redistribution will be much more 
difficult. 
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CHAPTER 4: Conclusion 
 
 
 
In addition to failing to reflect the needs of the Guatemala’s rural poor, the MLAR, can 
also be considered a massive failure in its own terms.  FONTIERRAS’ attempt to improve the 
functioning of Guatemala’s land market through its Access to Land and Land Regularization 
Programs has not produced the expected outcomes.  Instead of facilitating secure access to land 
and poverty reduction, these programs have resulted in beneficiary indebtedness, increased 
poverty, and further displacement.  
The objectives of FONTIERRA’s Access to Land Program and Land Regularization 
Program primarily have not been met because the MLAR model incorrectly diagnosed land 
concentration as a market problem rather than the result of inequitable power relations. Land 
concentration in Guatemala did not occur because of a poorly functioning land market or a lack 
of land title; land became concentrated through conquest, force, coercion, and finally, through 
consenting to the MLAR.   
Attempting to affect the concentration of land and wealth by extending the marketization 
of land and incorporating the poor into the market system has not produced a more equitable 
distribution of land, but has accentuated the inequality which has remained untouched by the 
reform.  Instead of improving the lives of the poor, this approach has further exposed the poor 
and their land, making them more vulnerable to capital and exploitation.  The market, in this 
way, has become an additional and legal instrument to serve those who welcomed the MLAR, 
supporting John H. Powelson and Richard Stock’s nearly 30-year old conclusion that when 
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agrarian reforms are granted, they are implemented for the benefit of those who grant them.188 
  The MLAR also failed because those who designed the model, reduced and simplified a 
very complicated, long-standing, and politically controversial problem.  There is no single path 
to successful agrarian reform and a one-size-fits-all model, such as the MLAR, cannot be 
expected to solve such a complex problem. A successful agrarian reform must take different 
forms in different physical and human environments and correctly diagnose the root causes of 
the problem it is seeking to rectify.189 
The success of the MLAR was also shaped by the flawed histories and assumptions 
which guided its approach and objectives. Previous state-led reforms, contrary to the WB’s 
narrative, were not always contentious, inefficient, and complete failures.  Many examples, 
including Guatemala’s state-led reform from 1952-1954 were highly redistributive.  Establishing 
a model on such a flawed interpretation resulted in many false assumptions and poor model 
design.  Limited access to the land market, lack of cadastral mapping and titles proved not to be 
as significant barriers to equitable land distribution, poverty alleviation, and development in this 
case, as broadly assumed by economists like de Soto and those who promoted the MLAR.  And 
improving access to the land market, mapping the countryside, and providing title to land, in 
effect, had little impact on these desired goals.  
 In addition to design flaws, insufficient capacity and deficient implementation caused 
further problems for these two programs in the form of delays, inefficiencies, and corruption. 
Various contexts and conditions (high interest rates, increasing market liberalization and global 
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demand for ethanol, and the WB funding projects which directly impeded the MLAR) again 
presented additional obstacles for both the programs and its beneficiaries.  
There is much scope for learning from Guatemala’s experience with the MLAR.  In many 
ways, this MLAR was inherently what it was promised not to be.  First, it was, in fact, highly 
contentious.  Many CSOs were unwilling to even recognise the socio-economic accord initially.  
Throughout the programs’ implementation, the MLAR failed to resolve land conflicts 
sustainably and even triggered further land disputes and violent evictions. The reform was also in 
no way efficient as the entire Access to Land Program was suspended.  Although significant 
growth was achieved through the MLAR, this growth occurred by capitalizing on the historical 
discrimination and social and political marginalization of Guatemala’s indigenous peoples, 
ultimately undermining the Peace Accords and the principals which continue to guide 
FONTIERRAS. 
Because the WB never required evidence to promote the MLAR initially, criticisms of 
the MLAR may continue to have little impact on the WB and elites which continue to welcome 
MLAR policies.  Nevertheless, knowledge of the MLAR and its outcomes is growing and 
criticisms of the model are mounting and on many fronts.  Failed experiences with the MLAR 
are being used to confront the WB and governments with more comprehensive demands, new 
paradigms, and alternative approaches to accessing and redistributing land.  According to the 
International Peasant Movement, La Vía Campesina, “capital is appropriating our territories.  
Hence, we must respond by turning the struggle for land into a struggle for territory.”190  Due to 
increasingly open, global markets and the inadequacy of recent agrarian reforms, which rather 
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than protecting small landowners have created more opportunities for land grabs, peasants are no 
longer seeking solely land and are instead putting forth proposals for “territory.” Territory is a 
more inclusive concept than land and encompasses the concepts of homeland, culture, religion, 
spiritual sites, ancestors, the natural environment, and other resources like water, forests, below 
ground minerals, etc.191  “Food Sovereignty,” La Vía Campesina asserts, is needed so that 
policies of agrarian reform and rural development might truly reduce poverty, protect the 
environment, and enhance broad based, inclusive economic development.192 According to their 
definition, food sovereignty is: 
 
the recognition and enforcement of the right to food and the right to land; the right of 
each nation or people to define their own agricultural and food policies, respecting 
the right of indigenous peoples to their territories, the rights of traditional fisherfolk 
to fishing areas, etc.; a retreat from free trade policies, with a concurrent greater 
prioritization of production of food for local and national markets, and an end to 
dumping; genuine agrarian reform; and peasant based sustainable, or agroecological, 
agricultural practices.193 
 
In going forward, much can be done to improve the land situation in Guatemala. Existing 
government responsibilities and obligations present a large opportunity to address inequitable 
land distribution. First, several unaddressed commitments in the Peace Accords must be fulfilled 
including implementing a higher land tax on idle land and returning traditional land to 
indigenous groups.  The GoG must also guarantee the rights of indigenous peoples as agreed to 
in Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention 169, which the GoG ratified in 1996.  Additionally, 
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IFIs like the WB must take responsibility for their role in funding projects like the Chixoy Dam 
and the Marlin Mine which have illegally and violently displaced indigenous peoples.  The WB 
must also take adequate measures to ensure that they do not facilitate illegal displacement in the 
future.  Meanwhile, foreign companies in Guatemala must be pushed to operate in a manner that 
does not interfere with the GoG’s obligations and local rights.  Currently, members of the 
indigenous Mayan Q’eqchi’ population from El Estor are pursuing three related lawsuits in 
Canadian courts against the Canadian mining company HudBay Minerals over human rights 
abuses at HudBay’s former Fenix mine in Guatemala.  The crimes for which HudBay is being 
tried for include: gang-rape, murder, and forced evictions.194  These trials are precedent-setting 
and are providing an important, if limited, avenue towards corporate accountability and the 
protection of rights in Guatemala.   
Finally, despite all promises and perhaps some good intentions, Guatemala’s MLAR, 
with its extension of the market and private property rights, has not benefitted the poor.  Instead, 
the MLAR has increased the reach of Guatemala’s elite, who continue to exercise their power 
and privilege, now even further, through a more expansive market.   Peasants continue to be 
driven from the land, poverty is increasing, and land is quickly becoming re-concentrated in a 
way which will be difficult to reverse.  Because of Guatemala’s MLAR, inequitable land 
ownership remains an enormous problem.
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